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 This study investigates the nature of koinodikion (“shared tribunal”) in Hellenistic 
Crete, addressing questions of what it was and how it functioned in intercity treaties, and 
particularly its relationship to the Cretan Koinon, or federation.  In my report, I examine 
koinodikion through a close reading of the inscriptional (IC IV.197, IC III.iii.4, and a new 
treaty between Gortyn and Knossos) and literary (Polybius 22.19.1-5) evidence, 
observing not only its use in a particular passage, but also that passage's significance in 
context of the whole document.  I then compare my findings in the Cretan context to 
attestations of koinodikion from outside of Crete, where the Cretan Koinon was not a 
factor.  Finally, I examine two earlier Cretan inscriptions (IC IV.80 and IC I.xvi.1) to 
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Introduction: What is Koinodikion? 
 
  The subject of my thesis is koinodikion and its use and implications in inscriptions 
from Hellenistic Crete.  The word is most commonly translated “shared tribunal”; it 
appears in three inscriptions from Crete (IC IV.197, IC III.iii.4, and an unpublished 
inscription from Chersonesos) and a passage in Polybius (22.19.1-5).  Koinodikion 
appears to be a court involving people from different jurisdictions, but since the ancient 
sources do not provide  a definition or an exhaustive explanation of particulars such as 
location, the procedure, whether the “shared” quality had to do with the identities of the 
judges or the litigants or both, whether it functioned in an arbitrational role or as an 
appeals court, even whether it handled public or private cases or both, the best one can do 
is to go back and reexamine what evidence is present.  I intend to carry out this 
examination with very close readings of the  sources, focusing upon koinodikion not only 
in its immediate passage, but also that passage in the context of the entire text.   
  I organize the following study in four parts.  In the first, I briefly review the 
dominant interpretations of koinodikion from the scholarship of the last century.  The 
second part is a thorough examination of each of the sources that explicitly mentions 
koinodikion in a Cretan context.  Of these, IC IV.197, IC III.iii.4, and Polybius 22.19.1-5 
have been published; the fourth, which I have called the “Chersonesos Stone”, has been 
made available to me through the generosity of  Dr. Angelos Chaniotis, who published an 
article on the inscription in 1999 but is only now in the process, together with Dr. 
Charilambos Kritzas, of preparing the final edition for publication.  These texts are, for 
the most part, long and complicated, with the term koinodikion occurring in, at most, one 
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or two of their provisions.  Rather than restrict my focus to the provisions in which the 
term occurs, I have undertaken a close study of the texts in their entirety in order to 
ascertain the overall focus of the text and the role of koinodikion within it. 
  Part Three examines the occurrences of the term koinodikion beyond Crete by 
examining the few contemporary texts that mention it.  These include four papyri from 
the reign of Ptolemy IV Philopator in Egypt, a letter from Eumenes II of Pergamon 
regarding a feud between the city of Teos and Dionysiac artists, and an inscription on a 
seal stone from Delos.  The non-Cretan comparanda enable the study of the word in 
political structures that differ from Crete's (e.g. in the strongly autocratic, yet culturally 
divided realm of Ptolemaic Egypt, and in the uneasy relationship between an independent 
city and an independent guild, whose dispute the Attalid king arbitrates), and thus allow 
us to consider what the word means on its own, without the Cretan political and social 
context.  They also permit us to speculate on the geographic range of the term, and 
perhaps even its origins. 
  The final part deals with two relatively early Cretan inscriptions, IC IV.80 and IC 
I.xvi.1 that do not explicitly mention koinodikion.  Both, however, are intercity 
agreements that establish a judicial venue for the adjudication of private disputes; even if 
we cannot establish an exact pedigree for koinodikion, we can at least consider the 
diplomatic, social, and political environment that preceded our earliest attestation of it. 
  
Notes on Modern Scholarship 
  The modern scholarship tends to view koinodikion as a tribunal for individuals of 
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different jurisdictions to settle their disputes, although there are those who think that it is 
a procedure or a shared cultural practice for dispute settlement.  In addition, scholars 
debate over whether koinodikion was an intrinsic facet of the Cretan Koinon as, for 
instance, its federal court.  The Cretan Koinon was a federal arrangement formed by the 
Cretan city-states during the Hellenistic Period.  While koina of independent cities were a 
common feature of Greek political organization during this time, the Cretan Koinon, as I 
shall discuss below,1 stands out as lacking many of the normal features of other 
Hellenistic koina such as federal citizenship or a federal dating system.2 
  Margherita Guarducci's view is representative of the mainstream, that koinodikion 
is the tribunal of the Koinon.  She argues that the use of the word outside of Crete, such 
as in the letter of Eumenes II3 simply means “mixed tribunal”, whereas on Crete it could 
be a “common tribunal” composed of representatives from the different cities, and 
possibly, from the evidence of Polybius 22.19.1-5, even mean “federal law”.4  The 
commonality between the two definitions is simply that the court has jurisdiction over 
more than one political community. 
  Ronald Willetts also associates koinodikion with the Koinon, but unlike 
Guarducci5, who places the Koinon's foundation in the Hellenistic Period, dates the 
Koinon back to the Archaic Period6.  He describes the koinodikion as something that 
“might be thought of in terms of mutually agreed federal custom, traditionally based upon 
                                                
1See p. 37. 
2For instance, IC IV.197 dates a Koinon decree based upon the eponymous officials of Gortyn and 
Knossos. 
3Welles #53. 
4Guarducci 1950 154. 
5Guarducci 1950 143, following van Effenterre. 
6Willetts 1975 220. 
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an ancient practice of submitting disputes to the arbitration of a tribal confederacy,”7 and 
that it was the authority of this custom that was invoked in IC III.iii.4, which provides for 
a court to settle the two cities' disputes in the absence of koinodikion.  In other words, it 
either was or was descended from an arbitrational body, and it was used to settle 
disputes.  He argues that koinodikion is actually evidence for an archaic koinon, seeing it 
as a reflection of Dorian kinship ties – and the Koinon itself as growing from Dorian 
tribal federations – based upon what he sees as similar to diagramma in a fifth-century 
treaty between Knossos and Tylissos.8 
  Maurice Van der Mijnsbrugge's 1931 book, The Cretan Koinon, interprets 
koinodikion to be not a court, but rather a contract that cities had to agree to in order to 
join the Cretan Koinon.9  By accepting koinodikion, this meant that cities were to adhere 
to the diagramma which, he thought, was “compulsory arbitration for public international 
differences.”10  Thus, koinodikion is not a court, but rather the agreement to go to 
arbitration before going to litigation or war, and the Cretan Koinon really a “treaty of 
peace”. 
  Most influential of the views that separate koinodikion from the Koinon is that of 
Henri van Effenterre.  He notes that most scholars characterize the Koinon itself as a 
diplomatically loose institution, with most city-states having the autonomy to make 
                                                
7Willetts 1975 220. 
8Willetts 1975 221.  The main problem I have with this argument is that Willetts does not really define 
koinodikion for his own purposes here (unless the reader is expected to consult Van der Mijnsbrugge's 
book for a definition), nor does he provide a very clear explanation of how he is using IC I.viii.4 
(Knossos/Tylissos); as a result, the reader is forced to take his word that a concept (which he has not 
fully explained) is analogous to an action in IC I.viii.4, for which he does not provide the text nor fully 
explain. 
9Van der Mijnsbrugge 1931 50. 
10Van der Mijnsbrugge 1931 51. 
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alliances outside of Crete, with or without the Koinon's approval.  He argues that 
koinodikion is a “mixed court”, not a federal court,11 and, in a variation on Van der 
Mijnsbrugge, suggests that “l'instant que les Crétois admettaient des tribunaux mixtes, ils 
pouvaient aussi bien accepter une juridiction fédérale.”12  Ultimately, he concludes that a 
sure connection between the Koinon and koinodikion cannot be documented. 
  Sheila L. Ager's 1994 article serves as an excellent way to examine all the texts in 
question, as well as to cover the main views on koinodikion up to that point.  She 
interprets koinodikion to be a court of “mixed jurisdiction”; she also agrees with Van 
Effenterre, viewing interpretations of a federal tribunal as “based on an overly optimistic 
reading of the evidence”, which, she says, disregard the “putative nature of the Koinon 
itself”.13  She concludes that it is either a “concept or a type of court”14 set up on an ad 
hoc basis to deal with the disputes of the citizens who fell under its bilateral jurisdiction.  
The appeal of this view is that it allows koinodikion to function in Crete without being 
bound to the Koinon, an otherwise extremely ephemeral federal structure.15 
  Philippe Gauthier's examination of koinodikion, in his 1972 book Symbola, 
interprets it to be a federal tribunal made up of judges from several cities that settled 
public disputes between cities, or between individuals and cities.  Private disputes, he 
argues, were the realm of bilateral agreements with which two individual city-states set 
                                                
11Van Effenterre 1948 146-7: By Van Effenterre's reading, the koinodikion in the Anaphe asylia treaty (IC 
IV.197) would be comprised of Anaphaians and Cretans, rather than a federal court comprising only 
Cretans. 
12Van Effenterre 1948 147. 
13Ager 1994 15. 
14Ager 1994 18. 
15Oddly enough, the inherent assumption here is that the institution actually functions.  See below for my 
comments in response to this. 
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up a judicial venue to address problems particular to their mutual situation.16 
  I have chosen to mention separately the view taken by Chaniotis on koinodikion 
in his 1996 collection of Cretan Hellenistic treaties17, even though it probably falls  under 
the first category.  Chaniotis argues that koinodikion is connected to the Koinon, but that 
the Koinon itself is merely a bilateral creation that exists when Gortyn and Knossos are at 
peace, and consists of these two cities and their allies.18  He concludes that it is like a 
federal court, and that it functions as a venue for settling disputes between two parties of 
disparate jurisdictions.19 The view certainly accommodates both the reality of Cretan 
political upheaval and sources that seem to connect koinodikion and the Koinon.  
 Chaniotis' view is confirmed in the most recent evidence, an inscription I am 
calling the “Chersonesos Stone”, which demonstrates the bilateral quality of the Koinon, 
but also that koinodikion was definitely the court associated with it.20   I will have much 
more to say on the subject, as I will be presenting Chaniotis' text of the inscription and 
my own translation of it in the second part of my study. 
 
                                                
16Gauthier 1972 323. 
17Die Vertäge zwischen kretischen Poleis in der hellenistischen Zeit. 
18Chaniotis 1996 143. 
19Chaniotis 1996 143: “Das Koinodikion ähnelt einem Bundesgericht.” 
20Chaniotis' 1999 article examines and provides a summary for the inscription; the publication of it is 
forthcoming. 
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Chapter 1: Attestations of Koinodikion on Crete 
 
I. IC iv.197: first half of the 2nd century (see Appendix, Document I) 
 This inscription, discovered on the island of Anaphe, is a declaration of asylia 
protecting the citizens of that island from marauding seafarers sailing out of Crete.  In 
many ways, this document provides the strongest in favor of koinodikion as an instrument 
of the Koinon, as well as offering a view into the way in which the Koinon itself might 
function. 
 Let us begin with who and what is actually mentioned in the text.  We are told 
that it is the result of a decision (e[doxe) of the synhedron (council?) and the “Koinon of 
the Cretans” (tẁi koinẁi tẁn Krhtaievwn) and that this meeting convened at Knossos 
(lines1-3)  The dating then follows, with the year, month, and day reckoned according to 
the Gortynian and Knossian systems, respectively, by kosmos and local month – a 
formula which, incidentally, takes up the first half of the inscription. 
 In the second half, the document grants asylia to the Anaphaians’ polis and chora; 
this appears to follow a previous declaration protecting the Anaphaian sanctuary21, also 
issued by the Koinon of the Cretans.  It then goes into the legal process that would ensue 
in a case of sylē, or violation (lines 17-25).  What is interesting about this violator (he 
who acts violently against any one of the Anaphaians) is that the document is more 
                                                
21 (lines12-17) It should be noted that iJero;n is educated conjecture and not actually extant in the text.  
However, it is quite clear that something else on Anaphe already has asylia and it is probably very 
likely to be the sacred precinct.  Rigsby 1996 358 notes that this is the best candidate we have for 
evidence of extension of inviolability from the shrine to encompass the polis and its chora. 
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concerned with where he is apprehended than his citizenship.  Tellingly, he need not be a 
Cretan, but, by virtue of having started out from Crete22, he is subject to this legal 
arrangement between the Cretan Koinon and the polis of Anaphe.  Furthermore, the 
citizenship of those who capture him appears to be very important: the document then 
distinguishes between two legal procedures: “among the Anaphaians (e[n] te 
jAnafaivoi[~])” he is liable to “any action they should proscribe”, while “in koinodikion”, 
he is aprodikos and aparbolos – that is, lacking the option to arbitrate or the need for his 
accuser to make a deposit.  The simplest logical way in which this could work would be 
if the choice of which procedure were determined by whether the one capturing the 
violator was Anaphaian or Cretan. 
 The parallel structure of this legal division raises some questions.  First of all, 
how are we to know which condition applies?  The simplest proposition that it is a 
question of where the violator is captured – especially since the violator becomes liable 
because of whence he sailed and where he attacked – which would then mean that the 
first condition applies to someone captured by the Anaphaians and the second to someone 
captured by the Cretans.23  By extension, this would indicate that “in koinodikion” is the 
Cretan court.  The only problem with this is that the document is otherwise very precise 
in its usage of “Crete” and “Cretans”: the “koinon of the Cretans” is mentioned twice, 
once at the beginning of the resolution, and once in reference to the previous resolution, 
and “from Crete” ([ejk Krhvt]a~) is the conjectured text to describe the violator’s point 
                                                
22 (line 19) This is handled by a participle, oJrmiomevnwn, from oJrmavw. 
23Rigsby 1996 360.  Rigsby observes that this applies to someone who attacks the Anaphaians on land; an 
Anaphaian attacked at sea does not seem to receive asylia from the Cretan Koinon. 
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of origin.  If koinodikion indeed stood for the the common court of the Cretan Koinon, 
could the document not have specified this as it did twice before, or is this simply not 
necessary?  Furthermore, does the statement that the judgment gains authority “according 
to the diagramma” have any bearing?  If diagramma is a Cretan institution, then it would 
mean that the enforcement of the decision has authority according to Cretan legal practice 
(praxis). 
 Another option is that the koinodikion is a joint court, but it would come into 
effect if Cretans captured the violator, and would comprise of both Cretans and 
Anaphaians.  This would certainly address the terminological difference between 
“Koinon of the Cretans” and “in koinodikion”, and also leaves open the possibility of a 
definition of koinodikion that is not linked to the Cretan Koinon.  Van Effenterre notes 
that the phrase “ejn k]oinodikivwni” lacks an article, which he says, indicates that this 
koinodikion is not a unique, established court but rather, in his opinion, something 
instituted here to accommodate the arrangement with the Anaphaians.24 
 One final issue to consider is the efficacy of the whole arrangement.  Trying a 
violator, regardless of his origin, in a court convened by those who captured him, allows 
an expediency suggested by the stripping of rights/procedures in koinodikion.  But how 
satisfied would the Anaphaians be with the whole procedure?  If the koinodikion were 
indeed simply the tribunal of the Koinon, would the Anaphaians allow a unilateral Cretan 
court to handle violators of Anaphe for the sake of expediency or would they worry that 
                                                
24Van Effenterre 1948 147.  Guarducci 1950 152 disagrees: she says that the lack of article in this 
reconstructed portion is parallel to the phrase “e[n] te jAnafaivoi[~ and therefore is not a significant 
counter-argument to the claim that the koinodikion is the federal tribunal. 
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the Cretans would be too easy on the defendants?25  Would the Anaphaians not have 
preferred instead a joint court of Cretan and Anaphaian representatives?  In either case, 
the option of Anaphaian prosecution appears to combine the economy of trying the 
defendant on-site, and a guarantee that the Anaphaians themselves may handle him as 
they see fit.26 
 
II. IC III.iii.4: Early second century (see Appendix, Document II) 
 This document is an agreement between the Cretan cities of Hierapytna and 
Priansos that seems to pick up where a previous treaty among the two cities and Gortyn 
broke off.  It is eighty-three lines long and largely complete.  The text includes three 
provisions that detail judicial procedures (lines 46-53, 58-65, and 65-71).  Most analyses 
of the mention of koinodikion in this text handle either one of or both judicial passages; I 
would begin instead with a broad survey of the whole treaty, aided by Chaniotis’ 
analysis27, so as to see how the judicial stipulations function in the context of the whole. 
 The agreement begins with the invocation of the gods and the dating according to 
the local calendar and leading kosmos of each city.  It sets the current treaty, established 
by a shared decision of the two cities, in the background of previous agreements set up 
                                                
25Gauthier 1972 324 believes that this meeting of the koinodikion was a special arrangement as part of the 
asylia decree, which was one of the few attested functions of the Cretan Koinon. 
26 Ager 1996 18, while introducing her collection of arbitrational inscriptions, notes that none of the 
inscriptions detailing a decision have been found in any of the “losing”cities; on the other hand, this is a 
declaration of asylia, not an arbitral verdict, and Anaphe could very well have prized protection from 
Cretan marauders over other matters, particularly if they had also been granted jurisdiction over anyone 
they apprehended. 
27 Chaniotis 1996 #28. 
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between Hierapytna and Priansos, and also by the two cities in common28 with Gortyn, as 
well as any other preexisting oaths and alliances.  It also asserts that the territories 
currently held by each remain the same. 
 The agreement then launches into the legal privileges that come with the treaty 
(lines 12-16).  With regard to status, citizens of both cities enjoy joint citizenship 
(ijsopoliteiva), the right of their intermarriage (ejpigamiva), the right to own property in 
the partner-city (e[nktesi~), and fellowship (metochv) in “all institutions divine and 
human”29; all of these civil rights, according to Chaniotis, would have been activated in 
the first place by isopoliteia.  Following this are economic concerns such as trading and 
taxation (lines 18-27).  These matters, for the most part, are to be handled according to 
the respective laws of each city; thus, any commercial transaction is to have authority 
according to the laws of the city in which it took place, and, presumably, is honored as 
authoritative by the other city.  In a similar way, enktesis allows a citizen of one city the 
right to buy and cultivate land in the other city’s territory, but he is subject to that city’s 
taxation, not his own.  However, someone who deposits goods in the other city and 
retrieves them for re-export does so without paying taxes, unless he resells the goods by 
sea. 
 Topically connected to this commerce section is the issue of grazing rights (lines 
27-30), which are allowed to people of either city without the imposition of taxes.  
Chaniotis notes that the higher altitude of Priansos would make it a better pasture in the 
winter, and Hierapytna preferable for the summer, and speculates that this clause reflects 
                                                
28 kata; koino;n 
29 Please see the discussion on the verb metevcein below, p.20. 
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and facilitates the transhumatory nature of animal husbandry in Crete.30  The treaty does, 
however, note that any damages will be assessed by the respective city where the injury 
occurred according to its laws; it is interesting to note, then, that this particular aspect of 
property damage remains under the respective jurisdiction of each city, and should not be 
included in other bilateral legal stipulations. 
 The agreement then turns to a section on the duties of the kosmoi and their role in 
facilitating diplomatic interaction.  The wording is a little unclear in the first part, but the 
kosmoi appear to be responsible for conveying embassies to the other city, and a fine of 
ten staters for the failure to do so is issued to the kosmos “sojourning there”31.  This 
“sojourning kosmos” is presumably addressed in the next section, in which he is welcome 
into the venue of the other city’s kosmoi and invited to join them in council (lines 34-38).  
The citizens are also invited to take part in the festival of Hera and to enter the andreion 
of each – privileges of isopoliteia.32 (lines 38-40)  Finally, the kosmos is bound to read 
out the stēle at the Hyperboia; a kosmos’ failure to do so will result in a fine of a hundred 
staters to the treasury of the other city. (lines 40-43)  The point of these duties is to 
reinforce the isopoliteia between the cities, as well as annually remind the citizens of the 
agreement. 
 Following this is the first of the three judicial passages, which lays out a legal 
remedy for dealing with someone who attempts to harm or break the current treaty (lines 
                                                
30 Chaniotis 1996 259-60. 
31 (line 33) oiJ ejpivdamoi; Chaniotis: anwesenden 
32Chaniotis 1996 261. 
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47-53).  If someone is willing33 to bring a prosecution against the accused offender, 
whether a kosmos or a private citizen, and that accuser wins, the fine will be paid in three 
parts, one to the accuser and the others to the two cities.  This clause is meant to protect 
the treaty, just as the previous one is for making the citizens of each city aware of the 
treaty and its conditions, as well as the renewal of the oath.  The division of the fine 
would at least serve as encouragement for one of the citizens to take up the defense of the 
treaty, and the sharing of that fine between the cities would hopefully favor a fair verdict, 
regardless of whose citizen actually tried to the break the treaty.  However, there is 
discussion here of who should judge and it what way the charges should be adjudicated. 
 Having provided some legal protection for the treaty, it next moves to the 
question of war booty (lines 54-58), stipulating how booty should be allotted if the two 
cities join in an official expedition or if individual soldiers from the two should take part 
in an action against a common enemy; each side receives a share in proportion to the 
number of participants from each, and a tenth is rendered to each city’s treasury.  This 
clause creates a pre-agreed formula for booty distribution so that it would not be a source 
of conflict for groups of armed soldiers just returned from war – who, one presumes, 
would have the greatest ability to cause unrest.  Even if quarreling among campaigners 
would not necessarily be a deliberate attack on the treaty – as in the case of the previous 
judicial clause – the effects, should they spiral out of control, could be just as harmful and 
not so easily remedied by a court procedure.  Additionally, the tithe portions, like the 
third portions of the fine from a treaty-breaker, make the cities equal financial 
                                                
33Lit. “Anyone who wishes may...” 
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beneficiaries when they uphold the treaty’s rules.  Private citizens out of uniform might 
not be able to cause as much physical damage as those as soldiers in uniform, but their 
dissatisfaction could undermine the relations between the two cities as well. 
 In the second judicial section, “preexisting injuries…from the time when the34 
koinodikion stopped” are addressed (lines 58-64).  The leading kosmoi of each city are to 
set up a court and to have cases involving both Hierapytnians and Priansians tried in their 
presence; the securities must be paid (by the accusers) within a month of the stēle’s 
erection.  While it is not clear what the koinodikion is, there are a few conclusions about 
it that one may draw from the provision: it is something that allowed citizens of the two 
cities to remedy injuries; and its stopping prevented those injuries from being remedied.  
One question is whether it is something that ended in the past – in which case the 
stipulations following it are to compensate for its loss – or whether this treaty is enacting 
a new koinodikion court.35  Whatever the case, the kosmoi are specifically asked to 
conduct trials in whichever court is agreed upon, which must be arranged within a month 
of the stele being set up.  The general idea seems to be to funnel all outstanding disputes 
into a mutually agreed venue and to do so quickly, so that they do not stand longer than 
they need and allow ill feelings between citizens to continue. 
 Having dealt with past wrongs, the treaty then addresses present and future legal 
conflicts (lines 64-71).  In this case, they should “use arbitration as the diagramma 
stipulates” and set up an appellate court (ejpikrithvrion) (presumably in the event that 
                                                
34 to; koinodivkion 
35The emphasis here is on the word “ajpoleivpw”: most readers (e.g. Ager 1994 4) take it to mean a 
permanent ceasing of koinodikion; perhaps it could indicate a pause, following the dissolution of the 
symbola indicated in lines 4-12. 
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the arbitration should fail) consisting of judges from a third city that both Hierapytna and 
Priansos agree upon.  The arrangements (security = ejgguvo~) should be made within two 
months of the treaty’s enactment, and the kosmoi should be present for the trial.  Here, 
the formulae are still ambiguous to us.  Assuming that the arbitration is a way to promote 
private settlement and lessen the burden on the intercity appellate court, is the arbitrator 
(prodikos) a person from the third agreed-upon city, or someone chosen by the litigants?  
What is the diagramma?  Does it prescribe arbitration, or does it provide guidelines for 
the arbitral process?  (According to Chaniotis, it is a list crimes and their financial 
penalties, and seems to provide for instances of arbitration, the failure of which requires a 
koinodikion, or else for cases, such as in IC IV.19736, in which pre-trial arbitration is 
abandoned.)37  Furthermore, does the appellate court address parties dissatisfied with the 
arbitral ruling or with the ruling of a court similar to the one described to deal with 
preexisting injuries (lines 58-64) over which only the kosmoi of the two cities preside?  
What is clear is that the arrangement of this system must be accomplished within a short 
time period, that arbitration should be employed early to minimize conflict, and that the 
ultimate decision should rest in the hands of a third city chosen by both and, theoretically, 
without bias. 
 The final section (lines 71-83) deals with such practicalities as enforcement, 
emendation, and display.  The kosmoi are charged with upholding all of the conditions of 
the treaty; should they not, there is a fine of fifty staters to be paid to the other city.  Any 
                                                
36IC IV.197 lines 23-27. 
37Chaniotis 1996 140.  Van Effenterre 1948 142 observes that the diagramma prescribes arbitration and is 
a list of penalties for crimes in intercity private law; Guarducci 1950 151 interprets it as a “code”, or 
“Magna Carta” of Crete; Chaniotis 1996 139 notes that it is a Hellenistic term, used on Crete only in 
association with the Cretan Koinon. 
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amendment may have authority so long as both sides agree to it.  Additionally, each year 
the annual kosmos has the responsibility of reissuing the stele; presumably, the 
emendations gain attention from this act, as well as the annual reading-out at the 
Hyperboia (lines 40-43).  Both cities are told to set up these stelai at the shrine of Athena 
Polias38; failure to do so will also result in a fine.  These stipulations ensure that the treaty 
can be changed as practical circumstances necessitate, and that the changes will be 
announced and prominently displayed in a well-known location. 
 How, then, do the judicial passages function in the whole text?  For one thing, 
they are part of a system designed to contain and deflate potential conflict.  They are also 
limited in scope by other sections.  For instance, issues of trade and taxation are to be 
handled by the laws of the city in which the transaction takes place and, thanks to 
isopoliteia, all parties should be treated equally according to those laws.  Property 
damage, at least from herded livestock, also falls under the laws of the respective city.  
And acquisitions of shared conquest have clear guidelines stated herein that apply to both 
cities so that soldiers know exactly what they are to expect from their efforts.  The first of 
these passages (lines 47-53), however, has a slightly different significance from the latter 
two.  It creates a legal procedure for protecting the interests of the treaty itself, and it 
makes the cities equally invested in the prosecution of the treaty-breaking defendant.  The 
other two passages (lines 58-64 and lines 64-71) act to prevent personal disputes in areas 
not covered by the previous sections from escalating into extra-judicial conflicts.  The 
                                                
38It is not certain whether each city has a shrine to Athena Polias, or whether there is one shrine where they 
both erect stelai.  Chaniotis 1996 is silent on the matter.  In the meantime, Perlman 2004 ll66, 1185 lists 
Athena Polias as the major protective divinity of both; however, while Hierapytna lists Athena Polias in 
three inscriptions (IC III.iii.3C lines 9-10, III.iii.4 lines 78-9, and III.iii.5 lines 5-6), the deity is attested 
for Priansos only here in this inscription. 
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procedure described in lines 58-64 is given less time to form and is conducted in a 
mutually-agreed format before both leading kosmoi.  As it addresses outstanding 
unresolved conflicts, its first goal seems to be expediency.  The procedure in lines 64-71, 
rather, is put in place to anticipate legal conflict; thus, its resulting court is given more 
time to assemble, particularly since the passage also prescribes an appeal to a third city as 
the disinterested deciding vote.  It might even have been the case that the first passage 
here need not be renewed in the next year, as the framework of the second carried over … 
or else could have been applied as a stop-gap measure if the cities ever disagreed on the 
third city. 
 A close reading of this inscription as a whole reveals that there are three distinct 
sections concerning judicial procedure.  The first (lines 47-53) is more closely connected 
to the duties of the kosmoi in the previous lines rather than the two (lines 58-64 and lines 
64-71) that follow the war booty clause.  In this reading, then, koinodikion seems to be 
one of these instruments of conflict containment; its absence may be the result of conflict, 
and result in a backlog of unsettled cases that could potentially exacerbate ill will.  The 
legal prescriptions in this document address one of two circumstances: either they 
compensate for the absence of koinodikion, or they reflect the reestablishment of 
koinodikion.  Whichever it is, its usage in this text is more closely linked to the settlement 
of private disputes than to the prosecution of those who deliberately undermine the 




III. Polybius 22.15.1-6: 184 BCE (see Appendix, Document III) 
 Polybius is our only pre-Byzantine literary attestation of koinodikion.  As with the 
inscriptions, the passage begins with local dating, but in this case, Polybius only uses the 
name of the Gortynian kosmos.  At the time (184 BCE), he states, Gortyn is exerting 
every effort to weaken Knossos, taking possession of Knossian territory and distributing 
it to their allies Rhaucos and Lyttos.  During this period, a diplomatic expedition led by 
Appius Claudius arrives from Rome with the purpose of settling the disputes between the 
island’s cities.  It appears that the majority of Cretans are fairly receptive to the idea of 
having the Romans settle their disputes, and they turn the matters over to them.39  The 
Romans proceed to restore the filched territories to Knossos.  In addition to this, the 
Romans order the Kydonians to take back hostages “whom they had left with Charmion 
before” and to remove themselves from Phalasarna without despoiling it in the process.  
Finally, they inform the Kydonians that they would be allowed to share40 in koinodikion, 
but if they did not wish to, then they and the Phalasarnian exiles (who would presumably 
be accompanying the departing Kydonians) should not interfere in the affairs of the other 
Cretans. 
 While the Gortyn-Knossos squabble and the Roman response seem well contained 
as a narrative, the Kydonian element, particularly the detail about the hostages with 
Charmion, reads as though the prelude is missing.  Although we do not know who 
Charmion was, we can safely assume that the hostages were a method of sealing an 
alliance with him that was unfavorable to the other Cretans – or else, why would the 
                                                
39 ejpevtreyan 
40 metevcein  metochv 
 19 
Romans order the Kydonians to take back their hostages from him?  We do know, 
however, that the Kydonian conflict started some years before this episode; the Romans 
were present on Crete about five years before, just after the defeat of Antiochus III at 
Magnesia in 190, when the Roman legate Q. Fabius Labeo attempted to settle a dispute 
between Kydonia and a Gortyn-Knossos alliance.  The effort was unsuccessful and Labeo 
was, for the most part, ignored.41  It seems, then, that although Gortyn and Knossos had 
their differences in central Crete, Kydonian activity could be enough to unite them, and 
they probably did not like the implications of Kydonia, to their west, occupying 
Phalasarna on the extreme northwest coast.  Furthermore, the Phalasarnan exiles were 
probably members of a pro-Kydonian party, expelled from rule thanks to the Roman 
decision; perhaps the ambassadors foresaw a potential conflict had these exiled citizens 
gone to other cities for support in returning to Phalasarna.  It is also worth noting that this 
conflict did not go away.  Polybius later tells us that Kydonia destroyed its former ally 
Apollonia, which had changed sides in favor of Gortyn and Knossos.  Fearing 
destruction, Kydonia appealed to Eumenes II, who sent the city three hundred men. 
 What does this passage suggest about the nature of koinodikion?  The text states 
that the Kydonians have to have some part in it, whatever it is, as a prerequisite for being 
involved in Cretan affairs.  Perhaps koinodikion is an arm of the Koinon, or at least 
acceptance of it was a prerequisite for non-member poleis to enter into alliances with the 
Koinon; while the text does not explicitly say “Koinon”, it does refer to the ethnic name – 
                                                
41 Labeo also demanded the return of Romans and Italians held in slavery on the island; only Gortyn 
responded to him, by releasing 400 of these captives – but in no way acted to submit the dispute to 
Labeo’s embassy.  Livy 37.60; Ager 1996 262. 
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oiJ Krhtaieì~ – which also appears in the context of the Koinon in IC IV.197.  Perhaps a 
different angle of consideration may come from the verb “metevcein”, “to take part”.  An 
epigraphic word search revealed that forms of the verb seem to be common in treaties: a 
few examples include participation in the sunodos (assembly) from Delos42 and a number 
of inscriptions from Calymna that include the formula metevcein43 w|sper kai; toi; 
a[lloi Kaluvmnioi (to take part just as the other Calymnians do).  In Cretan inscriptions, 
the word shows up in the form of a noun, just as it does in IC III.iii.4; in fact, the formula 
in that inscription (metoca;n kai; qeivwn kai; ajnqrwpivnwn) is repeated in a number of 
other Cretan treaties.44  In IC III.iii.4, the word shows up in a list of civic rights that each 
side would have to respect among the other city’s citizens.  In this way, it might be 
possible to say that participation in matters of koinodikion means taking part in 
something that is a civic institution linked to a particular community’s identity.  This 
definition would not necessarily preclude the koinodikion as an instrument of a federal 
Koinon, but it could suggest a Cretan communal identity, and that taking part in 
koinodikion is characteristic to that community.  Furthermore, if koinodikion was indeed 
a court, Polybius might imply that Kydonia ought not to engage in aggressive acts against 
other Cretan communities if it was not willing to put its disputes before the koinodikion 
beforehand.  Whatever the case, one’s participation in koinodikion has very real 
consequences, as it determines whether the Kydonians’ actions on Crete will be tolerated 
                                                
42 E.g. C4:115. 
43 The verb shows up usually as a plural, either finite or as a participle. 
44 These include: IC I.xvi.5 line 12; IC II.i.2 line 19; IC III.iii.3 C1 line 8; and IC III.iv.6 lines 3 and 4; 
most other treaties in the search appear with a greater part of the formula added by the epigrapher as 
conjecture. 
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by the other leading powers of the island. 
 
IV. “Chersonesos Stone” – Chaniotis & Kritzas: late 3rd century BCE?  (see 
Appendix, Document IV) 
 This inscription, referred to here as the “Chersonesos Stone”, covers both sides of 
a white marble stele (64 x 46 x 12 cm) with the top broken off.  Despite being discovered 
at Chersonesos, it preserves an agreement between Gortyn and Knossos; its original 
location appears to be Gortyn, but the scarcity of marble on Crete probably explains why 
it was moved and reused.  Due to the fragmentary nature of the text, I will be 
emphasizing what I consider to be the relevant passages, but have provided the full text 
and translation in the appendix. 
 Side A, which is generally much better preserved that Side B, does not mention 
either city by name, but details a series of judicial actions and fines.  It apparently relates 
to the problem of deserters (line 14: aujtomolikav)45, who are possibly being hidden (line 
6: tẁi kruvponti), although this is a presumption.  The document distinguishes between 
actions to take in wartime, as opposed to those that are applicable in peacetime, using the 
formula “kata; me;n to;n povlemon... kaq jiJrhvnan” three times.46  We cannot read what 
action is being taken with regard to the deserters in wartime, but it appears that the action 
in peacetime is some sort of legal procedure, with twice the amount lost being paid out 
“according to the diagramma” (line 17: kata; to; diavgranma).  Even if we set aside the 
                                                
45 aujtomolikav is otherwise unattested, and the substantiative that it modifies only survives in part. 
46Side A 13-14, Side B 22-23, 27-32. 
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question of the diagramma’s specific nature, we are still left with its usage and position 
in IC III.iii.4 (line 65) and IC IV.197 (lines 26-27), where it occurs in proximity to the 
mention of koinodikion in the context of establishing a judicial procedure.  In the later 
passages, the formula sets up an either/or formula for how a particular situation is 
addressed based upon the attending circumstances; thus, in the second passage on Side B 
(lines 22-24), the kosmoi take their oath with only the oJrkivstai, the oath administrators, 
attending, whereas in peacetime the same process takes place with embassies present 
while reading out the treaty in the assembly.  By this construction, it would seem that the 
peacetime situation should have some kind of substitution for whatever47 aujtomolikav is 
describing, perhaps a court procedure (dikav) prescribed by the diagramma. 
 The text that follows is very well preserved, if its sense is a little difficult to 
discern.  The assessors (line 18: oiJ ejreutaiv) are responsible for sending out the money 
that is being contended to the city from which the deserter in question came (line 20), but 
there are also stipulations for what should take place if they cannot recover the deserter 
himself: the city (presumably where he took refuge) is responsible for paying his fine 
(lines 22-23), for which the kosmoi are not personally liable (lines 24-26).  However, it 
appears that if the kosmoi do not make sure that the city pays the fine, any willing 
assessor or private citizen can bring a case against them (line 27).  The inscription on 
Side A seems to culminate in a completed clause (with the final n of hjgrammevnwn 
dropping to the line below), but this would be difficult to say with absolute certainty, 
                                                
47 Another idea I had was weaponry (o{pla), which made slightly more sense than the most popular words 
ending with –la, polla and t jalla/alla. 
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since the top of Side B is missing. 
 Side B is more difficult to read, but it still clearly informs us of which parties are 
agreeing to the judicial stipulations of Side A.  Line 3 is mostly blank, but the phrase tẁn 
Krhtaievw[n] is distinct, which refers to the neologism taken up by the Cretans during the 
Hellenistic Period, used often (but not always) with explicit reference to the Koinon.48  
The phrase [uJ]per tẁn aujtomovlwn in line 7 suggests that the text on both sides 
concerns deserters.  The subsequent passage (lines 9-20) describes the process of oath- 
and curse-making and –giving between the Gortynians and Knossians (line 20).  The 
war/peace formula occurs in the description of how the kosmoi should take the oath and 
curse based upon political circumstance: with only the oath-givers present in wartime 
(line 22), but in peacetime, in the first official assembly (of the year?) with embassies 
present while reading out the agreement (lines 23-24).  Such a clause would be 
understandable: the cities would be obliged to use the full ceremony when conditions 
permitted them, but the simplicity of the wartime ceremony would minimize the number 
of excuses kosmoi could make for not reaffirming an alliance, particularly if the two 
cities were fighting together against a common enemy. 
 The consequences to the kosmos for failing to read out the treaty and swear the 
oath and curse were severe: having the gods strike him with the curses he previously 
swore, or having to pay the immense sum of a thousand Cretan staters (lines 24-27).49  
The gods, of course, could do what they would, but the agreement sets up a procedure for 
the earthly business of fining: in wartime, a citizen would use the “dikasterion of the 
                                                
48 E.g. IC IV.197 lines 2 and 16-7 for both, and Polybius 22.15.2 for only oiJ Krhtaieì~. 
49  Chaniotis (forthcoming) section 21: the largest sum recorded in Cretan inscriptions. 
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kosmos”, the same court in which the other citizens carried out their business, but in 
peacetime, any Cretan could challenge either a fellow citizen or a someone from another 
city in either the koinodikion or in a court which two or more cities might set up with 
each other on an ad hoc basis to decide cases between their citizens. 
 The contrasting clauses here tell us something about koinodikion, even if what we 
learn is negative.  The koinodikion did not operate in wartime.  It was not one of the ad 
hoc arrangements such as the one between Hierapytna and Priansos in IC III.iii.4, but is 
an alternative to it, and was an institution encompassing many cities – Gortyn, Knossos, 
and their allies.  And because of the clear reference to the neologism oiJ Krhtaieì~, we 
can connect it with the contemporaneous existence of the Koinon. 
 
V. Conclusions 
a. Conflict Resolution and Prevention 
 This portion of my study has addressed the principal sources pertaining to Crete 
that explicitly use the term koinodikion.  Having finished my close reading of each, there 
are a number of issues that either present themselves or are rendered significant by their 
absence.  In the first place, it is worth noting, give or take the certainty of the dating, that 
they all occur in a time-space of seventy or so years (IC IV.197 and IC III.iii.4 in the first 
half of the second century BCE, Polybius’s episode in 184 BCE), with the Chersonesos 
Stone being the earliest (late third century BCE). 
 One common thread among all four is the mitigation of possible future conflict 
through various legal measures.  This would be an obvious characteristic of a peace 
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treaty, but it is still interesting to see the different ways in which potential conflict is 
anticipated.  IC IV.197 has the Cretan Koinon granting asylia to Anaphe, and at the same 
time making the islanders responsible for the prosecution of violators of that asylia whom 
they apprehend; it says little about the Cretans' role beyond setting up a procedure “in 
koinodikion”, but it means the the citizenship of the alleged violator does not determine 
the procedure and, in the court of the Anaphaians, probably removes Cretan interference.  
It seems to me that this is the conflict-reducing element here – the Anaphaians’ right to 
prosecute a Cretan violator with impunity – perhaps even more so than the corresponding 
prosecutorial formula of koinodikion with limited rights for the defendant. 
 The Polybius passage is a little more explicit in this regard: we see what changes 
the Romans make to Cretan territorial distribution, and what they hope to accomplish.  
Their answer to the Gortyn/Knossos conflict is, effectively, a return to the prewar 
conditions by ordering Gortyn to return Knossian lands that it had distributed to its 
allies50.  In the case of Kydonia, not taking part in koinodikion would have meant that it 
could no longer participate in Cretan politics or enter other Cretan territories without if it 
refused to submit its disputes to the common court before acting on its interests.  These 
measures may have curtailed the conflicts in question, even if they could not prevent 
future conflicts; after all, Kydonia had to appeal to outside help from Pergamum after it 
sparked a war with Gortyn and Knossos by destroying its former ally Apollonia, and 
Gortyn and Knossos went to war with each other after jointly destroying Rhaukos.51  The 
                                                
50The Roman embassy that investigated the Hierapytna and Itanos dispute, recorded in  IvM 20, sent 
instructions to the Magnesian court to return the territorial possessions to what they were before war 
broke out. 
51Polybius 28.14; the division of Rhaukos is recorded in IC IV.182. 
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former example demonstrates the vulnerability of Kydonia, the latter, a way in which 
changing circumstances created conflicts that Appius’ solution in 184 could not have 
directly addressed. 
 In the case of the Chersonesos inscription, I spoke about prescribing simpler 
wartime measures to lessen the difficulty of enforcing the treaty, but one point to ponder 
would be the series of measures against deserters, which take up the entire front side of 
the stele and part of the reverse.  Who are these deserters?  Are they fellow Gortynians 
and Knossians?  Are they members of allied cities mentioned in the oaths?  It seems that, 
in addition to needing to provide alternative plans for oath-swearing and the adjudication 
of disputes during war, measures were also necessary for a standardized treatment of 
deserters, regardless of their cities of origin. 
 As to the Hierapytna and Priansos agreement, I already have engaged in a lengthy 
discussion of how past and future disputes were funneled into their prescribed court 
procedures, and how commercial law, deliberate damage to the treaty, the distribution of 
booty, and emendations to the agreement all had a procedure or jurisdiction clearly 
indicated.  The extent of these stipulations, however, is in itself worthy of note.  As I said 
above (p. #), IC III.iii.4 could well be qualified as one of the bilateral agreements referred 
to in the Chersonesos stone (Side B lines 29-32).  It seems less surprising to me that a 
bilateral treaty would be much more detailed than these other accounts (the Polybius 
account may be of a different genre, but the conditions related seem fairly 
uncomplicated); after all, whereas the other three have dominant powers to enforce them 
upon weaker communities, Hierapytna and Priansos appear as equals in this text.  No 
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other powers are named here except for a previous three-party agreement with Gortyn 
(line 7), the conditions of which this treaty reaffirms for these two cities.  Is it possible 
that without the presence of a larger power like Rome or Gortyn or the Cretan Koinon, 
that Hierapytna and Priansos must instead depend upon a greater number of explicit 
measures to reduce conflict? 
 All of these documents aim to establish peace between two or more parties, using 
various techniques for conflict resolution.  Koinodikion, in all of these, functions as one 
of these techniques for conflict reduction, in the hope that disputes between the parties 
will be solved in a legal context rather than contributing to tension that might dissolve the 
very agreement. 
b. Identity: Koinon and OiJ Krhtaieì~ 
 Another issue to consider is the use of the terms Koinon and oiJ Krhtaieì~, as 
well as their absence.  Both terms occur together only in IC IV.197.  Polybius and the 
Chersonesos Stone do not refer explicitly to the Koinon, but both make use of the 
neologism oiJ Krhtaieì~.  Neither occurs in IC III.iii.4.  Both terms have been taken to 
indicate the Cretan Koinon, but I think it worth considering which is being used, in what 
context, to what end, and what it means for neither to be present. 
 I should note that I have found the term koinon particularly troubling in the course 
of this study because, as an institution, it struck me as rather ephemeral.  As Chaniotis 
states, the Cretan Koinon has left evidence of a council and assembly that granted of 
asylia (such as in IC IV.197), proxenia, and authorized military aid to other states, but 
unlike other Hellenistic koina, “there is no evidence for federal citizenship, federal 
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magistrates, a federal army, or federal resources.”52  Willetts provides a list of thirteen 
inscriptions that explicitly name the Koinon of the Cretans: 
1. IC II.xvi.9 (end of 3rd C. BCE): some cities of the Koinon53 recognize the 
asylia of the sanctuary of Amphitrite and Poseidon at Teos. 
2. IvM 4654 lines 10-12 (207/6 BCE): Epidamnus on the asylia to Magnesia-
on-the-Maeander, which it praises for its efforts to arbitrate peace in the 
Koinon of the Cretans.  
3. IvM 20 (end of 3rd C. BCE): fictitious decree of the Cretan Koinon 
decreeing the foundation of Magnesia. 
4. IC II.xvi.9 (early 2nd C. BCE): proxeny decree of Lappa for a 
Megalopolitan.55 
5. IC II.v.22 (early 2nd C. BCE): inscription from Axos in Western Crete 
naming the Koinon of the Cretans. 
6. SIG3 653A (165 BCE): decree naming the Cretan Koinon, favoring 
proxeny for Kassandros. 
7. ID 1517 (ca. 154 BCE): Koinon of the Cretans sending mercenaries to 
Ptolemy VI Philometor. 
8. SIG3 654A (ca. 151): Knossians and Cretan Koinon honoring Hegesandros 
of Athens. 
                                                
52 Chaniotis 1999 290. 
53 line 12: ejn tẁi koinẁ[i tẁn Krhtaievwn] 
54Rigsby 96; SIG 560. 
55 While “Koinon” is missing, line 1 contains s]ullovgwi Knw/[so]ì, similar to line 3 in IC IV.197. 
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9. Arch. Eph. 1925-1926, p. 13, no. 129.3: decree of honor for unknown 
person, from the Amphiareion, Oropos. 
10. IC II.iii.4C (241-197 or 159-138)56: decree at Aptara honoring Attalos of 
Pergamon. 
11. IC III.iv.9 (112/11 BCE): second Magnesian judgment of Roman-
mediated dispute between Hierapytna and Itanos. 
12. IC IV.197: Anaphaian asylia (see Appendix, Document I). 
13. IC I.xxiv.2: decree at Priansos of the Cretan Koinon honoring the Samian 
Epikles and the Samians. 
 What is interesting about this list is that, with the exception of the fragmentary #5 
from Axos, all of the inscriptions are either found in foreign locations or pertain to 
foreign affairs such as proxeny and asylia.  Willetts does not make this observation, nor 
anyone else to the best of my knowledge, but it suggests to me that the Koinon exists for 
the purpose of dealing with what may be loosely described as foreign affairs.  I would 
even go so far as to suggest that the Koinon as a body was meant to present a united front 
to the outside world, allowing foreign officials to feel that they are dealing with the island 
as a whole, even if not all of the communities of Crete belonged.  Perhaps one reason for 
granting Anaphe autonomy in prosecuting Cretans who marauded was  that the 
Anaphaians could not necessarily count on the Koinon to be effective in enforcing that 
decree. 
 IC IV 179, recording the agreement that Eumenes II made with thirty-one 
                                                
56 According to Willetts 1972 218 no. 14, there is a dispute as to whether it refers to Attalos I 
(Dittenberger, Guarducci, Van Effenterre) or Attalos II (Haussoulier, Michel, Blass, Scrinzi).   
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individual Cretan cities in 183 BCE, supports this suggestion.  Willetts sees the 
inscription as evidence that member states were not bound by federal policy57, but I 
would agree with Van der Mijnsbrugge's claim58 that Eumenes may have felt that his 
alliance would be more secure and lasting if he courted the cities individually rather than 
dealing with a nominal and politically ineffective federation.   Additionally, Eumenes 
may have recognized that if the cities were bound directly to him, they might be less 
likely to separate off following the lead of one of the major powers (such as Gortyn or 
Knossos) should one of those cities decide to do so.59 
 The use of the term Krhtaieì~, however, occurs in documents that are 
undeniably intended for a domestic audience.  In contrast to the moniker Krh̀~/Krhs̀sa 
found to apply to Cretans abroad60, Krhtaieì~ is an “artificially constructed ethnic 
name”61 that Cretans apply to themselves within the boundaries of their island.  It appears 
in IC IV.197, the Polybius passage, and the Chersonesos Stone; of these, only Polybius is 
written by an outside source; the latter two are found on Crete and have an entirely 
domestic context. 
  I confess that the idea of finding the ethnic label of “Cretan” outside of Crete 
surprises me a great deal less than finding it on Crete.  Common sense and experience 
both show that a person's identification with a place becomes more pronounced when one 
either leaves that place (as with the often intensified cultural identification of immigrant 
                                                
57 Willetts 1972 219. 
58Van der Mijnsbrugge 1931 25. 
59 Thank you to David Riesbeck for this idea. 
60Perlman 1996 245, in context of a survey of sub-regional ethnika as an indication of the  polis status of 
one's original locale. 
61Chaniotis 1999 292. 
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communities) or when one comes into contact with outsiders (witness the various waves 
of anti-immigration rhetoric throughout American history).  Perlman finds the attestations 
of Cretan sub-regional identity in the contexts of proxenia and , and of burial, observing 
that these coincide with the pattern of greater mobility outside of Crete in the Late 
Classical and Hellenistic periods.62  After all, why would a person have to identify with 
his hometown or even his island if he had stayed home among others with the same local 
identification? 
  Let us examine the context of Krhtaieì~ in each of the four sources listed above.  
IC IV.197 is explicitly a resolution of the Koinon dealing with Anaphe, so it makes sense 
to use the full title of the federal organization in the enactment formula (lines 1-2: 
[e[dox]e toì~ sunevdroi~ kai; tw[̀i koinw]̀i tẁn Krhtaievwn).  It is interesting, 
however, that the dating formula of the inscription does not include a date according to 
the local officials and calendar of Anaphe63, but rather a date according to the respective 
kosmos-ships and local calendars of Gortyn and Knossos.  Although the words around 
tẁn Krhtaievwn are missing, the rest of the treaty specifically involves Gortyn, Knossos, 
and their allies.  In the case of the Polybius passage, Gortyn and Knossos have been 
fighting, but as oiJ Krhtaieì~, they agree to hand their disputes over to the authority of 
the Roman ambassador.  Beyond this, however, Appius Claudius also issues the order to 
Kydonia that it should vacate Phalasarna and may only take part in Cretan affairs if it 
agrees to share in koinodikion, the wording of which (metevcein) suggests that 
                                                
62Perlman 1996 245. 
63Cf. IC III.iii.4, based upon the kosmoi of Hierapytna and Priansos, and IC I.xvi.1, listing both the 
Gortynian and Latoan kosmoi. 
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koinodikion could also be construed as a Cretan civic institution – i.e., those who do not 
partake of it are “not Cretan” and are thus barred from meddling in the rest of Crete.64 
 As to “the rest of Crete”, Chaniotis has observed that the alliance of Gortyn and 
Knossos is usually indicative of the presence of the Koinon65; if the joint dating in IC 
IV.197 is any indication, this probably reflects the political reality of the two strongest 
cities on Crete in the seemingly rare cases when they are not in opposition to one another.  
Furthermore, from the Chersonesos Stone, he observes that, 
“The new text, when placed with the other Hellenistic evidence for the 
relations between Knossos and Gortyn, their separate alliances, and the 
Koinon, indicates that the Cretan Koinon, unlike other Hellenistic koina, 
did not have an advanced federal structure, but was simply a bilateral 
alliance between Gortyn and her allies and Knossos and her allies.   and  
existed whenever the two alliances cooperated and fall apart whenever the 
leading powers were in conflict.”66 
 
While I must agree based upon the evidence that Koinon and koinodikion are 
closely tied to the relations of these leading states, I would like to suggest that 
perhaps the ethnic name Krhtaieì~ and institutions such as koinodikion and 
diagramma also have cultural currency as indications of a community’s Cretan-
ness; thus, use of and/or adherence to diagramma is an accepted condition of city-
to-city judicial agreements such as IC III.iii.4 in which koinodikion has gone out 
of use (line 59: ajf jw| to; koinodivkion ajpevlipe crovnw). By extension, it can 
also mean that lack of acceptance is a demonstration of un-Cretan behavior – thus, 
                                                
64This is similar to Van der Mijnsbrugge's explanation of koinodikion as the “'conditio sine qua non' of 
membership in the Cretan Union” (1931 50). 
65Chaniotis 1996 143. 
66Chaniotis 1999 294. 
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Kydonia's rejection of koinodikion would disqualify it from taking part in Cretan 
internal affairs (or, in real terms, acting aggressively against other Cretan states); 
perhaps this applies as well to the unnamed opponent in the Chersonesos Stone 
that is neither Gortynian nor Knossian nor one of their respective allies (Side B 
lines 13-14: to;~ de; Gortunivo~ oJ Knwv[sioi oiJ---------17---------]wn suvnmaco~ 
ojrkixavntwn), and therefore not swearing to an agreement that includes the option 
of koinodikion in peacetime (Side B line 31).  In this way, the terms Krhtaieì~ 
and, to some extent, koinodikion, function as a way of identifying the “other” as 
Cretan communities that do not cooperate with the united Gortyn and Knossos. 
  
 There are still many questions remaining, however, that are fundamental to the 
definition of koinodikion.  For one thing, if koinodikion was a court, how would it have 
been composed?  Was the court restricted to one specific location, or would it stand for a 
circuit court that would send out judges to cover cases?  Who would use it and why? – for 
instance, could it have been a way for a citizen who wanted to prosecute a corrupt 
kosmos to level the playing field?  Furthermore, is it significant that IC III.iii.4 and the 
Chersonesos Stone refer to koinodikion with a definite article67 but IC IV.197, an 
international decree for Anaphe, does not68?  I suggest that it might be; both IC III.iii.4 
and the Chersonesos stone have a purely Cretan context and audience, whereas IC IV.197 
is meant for an audience abroad.  Is it possible koinodikion could have two functions – as 
a court for the Cretan Koinon and as a bilateral court established between the Koinon and 
                                                
67 line 59 (to; koinodivkion) and side B line 31 (tẁi koinodikivw/), respectively. 
68 line 24: ejn k]oinodikivwi 
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Anaphe?  For that matter, how does koinodikion work outside of Crete?  Is it a court 
associated with a federation or does it only have bilateral jurisdiction?  I am not going to 
be able to answer all of these questions, but by examining non-Cretan attestations of 
koinodikion in the next chapter, we can observe how koinodikion functions abroad and 
what the implications are for its usage on Crete. 
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Chapter 2: Attestations of Koinodikion Outside of Crete 
 
 There are two, perhaps three other sources that attest to the usage of koinodikion 
outside of Crete.  They are in some cases fragmentary, and have received less attention 
than the Cretan material.  I read the passages, as above, for context; however, I focus on 
the relevant passages only, unless otherwise noted.  How do the non-Cretan attestations 
correspond with Cretan usage and how do they differ?  Do either conflict resolution or 
ethnic identity come into play?  Ultimately, in the vein of Guarducci and van Effenterre, 
are we speaking a similar institution in the other places as on Crete, or not? 
 
 I. Egypt (e[nteuxi~ Papyri) 
  Four papyri from Magdola (modern Medinet Nehas), Egypt, all dated to 221 BCE 
at the beginning of the reign of Ptolemy IV Philopator, that are e[nteuxi~, or petition 
letters, addressed to the king, provide our evidence for koinodikion in Ptolemaic Egypt.  
All four of these letters69 have two things in common: they involve a dispute between an 
Egyptian and a Greek, and they all have an instruction appended to the end of the letter – 
mav(lista) di(avluson) aujtouv~: eij de; mhv, ajp(ovsteilon) o{p(w~) ejpi; tou ̀
koinodi(kivou) di(akriqẁsin)70 – “best to reconcile them; if not, send them back so 
that they may be judged before the mixed tribunal (koinodikion).” 
  Derek Roebuck, in his survey of Greek arbitration, notes that while this particular 
                                                
69Guéraud 1931 #11, 44, 65, and 70. 
70Ager 1994 9 no. 37 quotes this from Guéraud #11, noting that other papyri have the same formula, with 
varying degrees of urgency. 
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type of tribunal is only evidenced in the four texts, this endorsement by the higher official 
(representing the king) to the lower official, or stratēgos, who would be in closer contact 
with the disputants, appears on documents dating from 242 to 217 BCE.71  Furthermore, 
we should note that with all of these, the first action is mediation by the official – so we 
can probably assume that koinodikion here represents formal litigation, although formal 
arbitration could also be a possibility.  According to Roebuck, it seems that the 
stratēgos72   
 generally passed off some petitions to clerks to send to other courts; however, he notes 
that “if there was an appropriate court in session, the stratēgos would make use of it; if 
not, he had to handle the matter himself, perhaps at times with the help of deputies and 
assistants.”73 
  With regard to these tribunals, we know that at the time, there were two types of 
collegiate courts for handling civil disputes, and that these were decided by ethnicity.  
The court of the native Egyptians disputing each other was the laokrivtai, which, in the 
third century, was supervised by a stratēgos74 in an organizational capacity.  For the 
Greek inhabitants, the court was the crhmatistaiv.  Originating during the reign of 
Ptolemy II Philadelphos (r. 283-246 BCE), it was a circuit court of three officials 
appointed by the king.  Given the composition of Egypt with its very native South and the 
                                                
71Roebuck 2001 321. 
72Taubenschlag 1944 370: “The competence of the strategos was very far-reaching: he co-operated in 
preliminary proceedings for the above-mentioned courts; he issued injunctions and took part in 
executional proceedings.  He acted as arbitrator in civil cases, had a restricted penal jurisdiction and a 
disciplinary jurisdiction over the pragmateuovmenoi, that is, state officials in general, unless the 
defendant was superior in rank.  He was employed as the king's deputy in civil litigations and in certain 
cases of voluntary jurisdiction.” 
73Roebuck 2001 334. 
74Taubenschlag 1944 366. 
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Greek cities in the North, it is easy to see how such a dual system might have developed, 
with officials early in Macedonian rule perhaps finding it simpler to monitor native courts 
and create a venue for Greek immigrants, rather than impose an entirely new system upon 
the whole country.  Koinodikion, then, served to bridge the jurisdictional gap between 
Egyptian and Greek disputants.75 
  The koinodikion in Ptolemaic Egypt addressed the shortcomings of a very specific 
judicial system; unlike Crete, with its loosely affiliated poleis and their shifting alliances, 
the Ptolemies had a strong, stable central government.  The term refers to a court, since it 
stands in place of the two ethnic courts and because the papyri adduce it as the (less 
preferable) option, should mediation and/or arbitration fail.  One point to note, however, 
is that there is no mention of its composition.  In other words, we cannot say whether 
there was one judge or several, and whether the judge(s) were Greek, Egyptian, or a 
mixture of both; however, if the Greek supervision of the laokrivtai is any indication, a 
Greek was definitely responsible for the court, whether the judges were Greeks or a 
mixture of both.  I would suggest, then, that the identities of the litigants are, as a rule, 
more important to the jurisdiction of koinodikion than those of the judges. 
 
                                                
75Roebuck 2001 304.  In 118 BCE, Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II declared the division to be based upon the 
language in which the original contract was composed rather than the ethnicity of the parties; the 
advantage of this perhaps reflects a need for greater flexibility in dealing with Jews, Romans, and others 
that did not fit into the dual court system.  (At least, I am assuming that koinodikion was still working at 
this point; I am very much aware that only so much can be made of four attestations from the same 
year, but the assumption is that as long as cases were handled based upon ethnicity, there would have to 
be some sort of venue, koinodikion or otherwise, to handle them.  Perhaps the policy of adjudicating 
based upon the language of the contract happened earlier than 118; it would certainly have been more 
convenient, given the diversity of a city like Alexandria, and could have been taking place long before it 
was codified at that late date.) 
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II. Pergamon (Teos and the Dionysian Artists) 
 The other important reference comes from Pergamon.  It details the decision of 
Eumenes II as arbitrator between the city of Teos and the Guild of Dionysian Artists, 
from around 170-160 BCE.  The inscription in question was heavily damaged when the 
building it was inscribed76 on was destroyed during the early period of Turkish 
occupation, and it is very fragmentary as a result.77  For the sake of this study, I am only 
going to concentrate on the relevant section: 
Welles #5378 IIA, lines 1-9 
 tou;~ novmou~  [. . . . . . ] INS [¬ ¬ 15 ¬ ¬ ]. EIS 
 th;m provnoiam poeìs [q]ai pro;~ t[o; diathrhqhǹa]i pavn- 
 ta to;g crovnon aujtoì~. dioikeìsqa [i] de; kai; ta; kata; to; 
koinodivkion w{sper sunqevnto pro;~ uJma~, oJrkizo- 
mevnẁn tẁn dikastẁn o}n trovpog kai; e[mprosqen.  5 
eij de; prosdeit̀ai diorqwvsew~ oJ uJpe;r touvtou novmo~, 
kai; provteron eJtoivmw~ e[cein sundiorqous̀qai kai; 
 nuǹ to; aujto; poiouǹta [~ meq j] hJmẁn euJreqhvsesqai 
 [ ajmevmptou~ o[nta~ –   –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  – ] 
 
 [. . . . . . ] they were taking thought for [the 
preservation] (of these things) forever.  They were 
managing the joint court as they had agreed with you, 
the judges being sworn in the same manner formerly.  
If the law relating to this needed correction, they 
were ready even before this to join in correcting it and 
now in doing this [with] us they would be found 
[irreproachable. . . . . ]79 
 
  Before examining this text, it should be noted that the Ionian-Hellespontian80 
                                                
76Probably the Temple of Athena. 
77Welles 1934 219. 
78Also, Le Guen #47 and Aneziri 2003 #D12. 
79Trans. Welles.  Welles' transcription seems to be standard, as Le Guen and Aneziri both make use of 
them, and Le Guen's translation does not change anything either. 
80Slater: There was no large organized global guild, but rather a “loose cooperation” between different 
regional groups. 
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Guild of Dionysian Artists, founded sometime before 237/6, described itself as a koinon 
(e.g. tẁi koinwì tẁ[n pe|ri; t]on Diovnuson tecnitwǹ); the particular reference 
comes from an inscription81 dating to between 218 and 206 in which Teos endowed the 
Artists with tax-exempt land.   Among other benefits, the endowment offered a certain 
amount of protection to the city thanks to the Artists' sanctuary being voted asylia82.  The 
timing of the document is perhaps fifty years after this (c. 170-160 BCE), and shows that 
at this point, the relationship is strained enough that the King – who could perhaps be the 
only one with enough muscle to enforce a decision regarding an international association 
– must become involved to arbitrate. 
  Although most of the letter seems to deal with the issue of finances and taxation 
with regard to Dionysian festivals (panegyris)83, the koinodikion here does not seem a 
means for resolving this conflict so much as one of the further points of contention – it 
had been organized to mitigate conflict by adjudicating disputes between the city and the 
Guild, but now the organization of the koinodikion itself is in dispute.84  In any case, it 
appears that a decision or series of decisions is being called into question based upon the 
validity of the oath taken by the judges, i.e. the tribunal rather than the individual judges.  
Eumenes responds that this cannot be enough to invalidate the court's decision, since the 
oath and court had already been agreed upon, and since there were procedures established 
                                                
81Aneziri #D2; SEG II 580, from Teos. 
82Asylia is recorded in inscriptions enacted by political entities including the Aetolians, Antiochus III 
(while Teos was a Seleukid possession), the Cretan Koinon (Willetts #1 above), and Magnesia.  Strabo 
XIV.1.29 reports that when Attalus III moved the Guild from Teos to Myonnesos (c. 145-133), the 
Teians appealed to the Romans not to allow Myonnesos to be fortified against them, presumably from 
the benefits of their asylia.  The Guild eventually left Myonnesos and settled at Lebedos. 
83No doubt the result of a city hosting a profitable festival on land that it had declared tax-exempt. 
84Aneziri 2003 100. 
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that the unhappy party could have taken to change those oaths if there had been a 
problem with them before the trial. 
  There are a few points on koinodikion that one should consider here.  In the first 
place, I mentioned the self-described nature of the Guild as a koinon because it is 
important to note its political separateness from Teos in forming a koinodikion.  This 
koinodikion appears to be established from an agreement between the two political 
entities – perhaps in the manner an ad hoc arrangement like IC III.iii.4 – and the 
document by which it was set up seems to have had an amendment procedure.  It was 
probably bilateral between the Guild and Teos without being associated with royal 
control, unlike the Egyptian courts, since the koinon and the city are autonomous from 
each other and the Attalid king was clearly acting in the position of arbitrator.  One thing 
that could still be open for discussion is the composition of the court; certainly the 
jurisdiction applies to individuals between the two different groups, but what about the 
judges?  Could the judges have been Teian?  It certainly would have been in Teos' 
interest financially to regulate Dionysian activity.  And if so, was this one of the reasons 
why the Guild contested the judges' oaths? 
 
III. Delos 
  The final and most obscure reference comes from an article by Marie-Françoise 
Boussac about seals found on Delos.  One of these seals has five lines of text – three with 
Semitic lettering, the fourth spelling KOINODIK, and the fifth with a date in Seleukid 
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years (EPR = 185 A.S., or 128/7 BCE), prefixed with initial L.  Boussac argues that 
the “L” stands for “Lagid”, indicating that the seal was from southern Phoenicia, 
previously an Egyptian possession.85 
  Of course, making a definitive assessment of the nature of koinodikion based 
upon this seal would be highly problematic: the word koinodikion is not complete, and 
the Lagid claim seems difficult to use conclusively.  Nevertheless, it at least opens the 
door to some ideas of how koinodikion traveled, particularly if the “L”indicates a 
Seleukid possession that still felt a cultural connection to Egypt, since the Egyptian 
attestations of koinodikion date to the late third century.  One should consider the 
relationships of Egypt and Teos with Crete.  In the case of Egypt, eastern Crete, 
specifically Itanos, enjoyed the protection of the Ptolemaic kings from around 270 until 
their retreat from their Aegean possessions in 145 BCE.  In fact, the Ptolemies' 
withdrawal from Crete created a power vacuum in the eastern part of the island that 
resulted in the destruction of one Cretan city, Praisos, and a conflict that had to be 
arbitrated not once but twice by the Magnesians under the auspices of the Romans.86  The 
Ptolemies also had ties to other cities in Crete, including Gortyn; according to Strabo, 
Ptolemy IV Philopator aided in the building of its walls.87  In the case of Teos, the 
connection is witnessed in numerous decrees of asylia  from a number of individual 
                                                
85Boussac 1982 444. 
86After the retreat of the Ptolemies, Hierapytna attacked and destroyed Praisos, and laid claim to the shrine 
of Zeus Diktaios, over which Praisos had disputed with Itanos.  The Romans sent an embassy to 
investigate, framed the dispute, and sent it to the Magnesians who had hereditary ties to Crete to decide.  
The Magnesians found in favor of the Itanioi in 143-141 BCE, and again, when the Hierapytnians 
intruded upon Itanian territory, c. 112 BCE.  The narrative of both and the verdict of the second is to be 
found on IC III.iv.9, found at Magnesia. 
87Strabo 10.4.11. 
 42 
Cretan cities, as well as a group of city-states “from the Cretan Koinon” recorded in IC 
II.xvi.9.  Rigsby notes that in two of the inscriptions recording Teian requests for 
renewal, the ambassadors, Dionysiac artists, performed “recitals of the traditional 
relations of Crete and Teos”88.  We should not be surprised at this connection, either: 
Crete's close ties to Magnesia-on-Maeander and Miletus, both in the same region of Asia 
Minor as Teos, are well-documented; Magnesia provides a false decree of foundation by 
the Cretan Koinon (IvM 20) and Ephorus in Strabo reports that Miletus was founded by 
Cretan colonists89.  Is it possible that koinodikion was in fact a native Cretan institution 
that was spread by way of Cretan cultural contacts and was interpreted to meet the needs 
of its borrowers?  Or was it Egyptian, whence it spread to Crete?  It certainly seems 
worth consideration, and makes one wish for more external evidence by which to test 
these hypotheses.90 
                                                
88Rigsby 1996 289: the performances are recorded at Knossos (IC I.viii.2) and Priansos (IC I.xxiv.1). 
89Strabo 14.1.6.  Plato (Laws 1.636b) also refers to the Milesians as having the same syssition and 
gymnasia as Crete, although in this case, they prove dangerous in civil upheaval. 
90I have another hypothesis that I would like to add: as I mentioned in my introduction (p. 3), Guarducci 
postulates that koinodikion functions as a “federal tribunal” on Crete, and as a “mixed tribunal” 
elsewhere (1950 154).  We have observed that in the cases of both Egypt and Teos that the koinodikia 
there appear to be bilateral, but from the Chersonesos Stone we learned that on Crete, koinodikion is not 
a bilateral court (lines 29-32).  The Anaphe inscription (IC IV.197) is an oddity because it prescribes the 
Cretan court to prosecute sylē as an  alternative to an Anaphaian prosecution.  I wonder whether this 
court, with its bilateral jurisdiction (Anaphe and Crete), is not the Koinon court, but rather a bilateral 
court, more closely akin to that of Teos and the Guild.  This would support van Effenterre's observation 
of the lack of article regarding ejn k]oinodikivwi in line 24, and stands in contrast to  to; koinodivkion in 
IC III.iii.4 (line 59) and ejn twì koinodikivw/ in the Chersonesos Stone (lines 30-31), which both have 
exclusively domestic contexts (IC III.iii.4 between two Cretan cities, the Chersonesos stone between 
Gortyn and Knossos, and their allies).  I am not quite certain how the  peri; de; tw`n kata; koinodivkion in 
Polybius fits into this scheme, but I am tempted to give Polybius some leeway, since he is writing about 
this from an outsider's perspective.  Perhaps the Koinodikion of Crete was something that grew out of 
an arrangement between Gortyn and Knossos from Cretan legal practices (see next section), while a 
koinodikion is a type of court, formalized in Egypt (where, as I said, its inception would have been an 
organic response to the problem of different courts for Greeks and Egyptians) and picked up by the 
Teians to deal with the autonomous Guild – and, I suggest, also used by the Cretan Koinon as part of 
their asylia declaration for Anaphe. 
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Chapter 3: “Common” Judicial Treaties from Crete 
 
I. IC IV.80: 5th C BCE (see Appendix, Document V) 
 This 5th century agreement between Gortyn and Rhitten is by far the earliest 
example in our sampling and provides some clues into how intercity judicial agreements 
might have operated before the Hellenistic Period.  As with other treaties in this study, IC 
IV.80 has been the subject of a good deal of consideration, but mainly in parts rather than 
as a whole.  Once again, my hope is to pull a more thorough understanding from reading 
the text as a whole, though, admittedly, it has a lot of uncertainties both in content and in 
the meaning of various terms. 
 The agreement opens with the invocation (Gods!) and the Gortynians 
acknowledging the self-government and independent jurisdiction of the Rhittenians (line 
1).  It then stipulates that the Rhittenians pay 350 staters for the triennial sacrifices at 
Mount Ida (lines 1-3).  The strongest impression upon the reader at this point is that the 
two cities do not have equal roles in this treaty.  Whereas other (later) treaties follow the 
invocation with dating from both political entities and have reciprocal language showing 
that each city will behave in the same way with regard to the other (c.f. IC III.iii.4, IC 
IV.197), this treaty opens with the Gortynians granting (perhaps limited) sovereignty to 
Rhitten.  While Gortyn's acknowledgment of Rhitten's political and judicial autonomy 
and Rhitten's sacrificial obligation could be considered reciprocal, they are not identical, 
and the treaty stands out as not having stipulations equal for the two cities. 
 The next section (lines 3-4) deals with a specific commercial issue: if someone 
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builds a house or plants trees on a piece of land, then according to this clause, he has the 
right to offer the house and the trees up for sale.  Let us consider for a moment the 
circumstances that might prompt this; for these things to be in question, the builder 
and/or planter probably does not own the land, but he has invested money and labor in 
improvements to it.  One might imagine that a conflict could arise between the 
landowner, who wishes to enjoy the benefits of the land's appreciated value, and the 
renter, who would wish to profit from the value he has added when another renter 
acquires the land, or when he sells the yield from the trees he planted.  What we do not 
know is which city tended to furnish the landowners and which the renters – or even 
where the land is – and while Karen Kristensen argues that this may have been a mutual 
right,91 the lack of mutual language suggests that each party was more likely to perform 
one of the roles than the other, even to the point of mutual exclusivity.  Paula Perlman92 
envisions the Gortynians being the owners and the Rhittenians as the renters, but I might 
posit instead that we could have a case of Gortynian renters and Rhittenian landowners, 
as I shall explain below.  In any case, if we are going to read this agreement in a holistic 
fashion, we should give more weight to this clause than just as an economic stipulation, 
but rather as the core issue between these two communities that the rest of the text 
addresses. 
 In the next section (lines 4-8) we have a procedure involving officials, who are 
probably Gortynian, and the Rhittenian kosmos.  The startagetas and “the one serving as 
                                                
91Kristensen 2002 73 notes that there is reciprocity between the two cities, but misses the lack of identical 
conditions in bilateral treaties between equal cities; this, to me, serves as an indication that our 
document is addressing a particular conflict rather than standing as a general principle between the two. 
92Perlman 1996 264.  It should be noted, however, that the change in view came from a discussion with 
Dr. Perlman in 2009. 
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kosmos” (kosmivonta) who goes to Rhitten shall, with the Rhittenian kosmos present, 
fine “whoever does not obey” (to;n me; peiqovmenon) one drachma.  There are a few 
things that are odd about this passage: for one thing, who is the startagetas?  Most 
interpretations identify him as a military official such as a garrison commander.  Perhaps 
it could make sense having a military governor present if Rhitten were in some way a 
dependent of Gortyn; on the other hand, what does the military have to do with the 
renter/landowner disputes from the previous sentence?  Is it possible that what we have 
instead is simply a Gortynian official who may have civic if not military powers?93  
Either way, the Gortynian presence at Rhitten seems to undermine the status of Rhitten as 
“aujtovnomo~ kai; aujtodivko~”. 
 Another strange detail in this procedure is the fine of a drachma.  Whereas one 
expects to find sizable penalties in Cretan inscriptions, such as the fifty staters charged to 
the Priansian or Hierapytian kosmos who does not carry out the terms of the mutual 
agreement94, or the 150-stater fine listed on the Chersonesos Stone.95  A drachma is not a 
very large sum of money; if we are to assume that it was the equivalent of a skilled 
                                                
93The problem here is a conflict between context and an obvious linguistic form.  The startagetas and the 
startos (line 7) certainly look like “general” and “army”, but they do not make so much sense in the 
context of the inscription.  Kristensen 2002 74 argues that the location of Rhitten (at modern Prinias) 
would necessitate the protection of an important northern route to the coast, and thus the presence of a 
military official; the location is archaeologically uncertain, however, since G. Rizza's investigations of 
Prinias show no occupation on that site at the time the inscription was carved.  Kristensen does not deal 
with this evidence in a convincing manner and, having dismissed it, concludes that military strength 
was necessary at Rhitten due to its location.  I do not have a full solution to this problem, but I refer the 
reader back to my discussion of the Egyptian koinodikion papyri, in which I discuss the role of the 
strategos in Ptolemaic Egypt.  Perhaps that officer began in a military capacity earlier in Egypt's 
history, but his role in the judicial process by the last quarter of the third century suggests that he was 
more a civil servant.  At the very least, it serves as an example of a traditionally military title being 
applied to a non-military capacity. 
94IC III.iii.4 line 72. 
95Face A line 9; the context is unknown – presumably having to do with deserting or interacting with 
deserters? 
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laborer's day's pay,96 then we have a sum that would have been difficult but perhaps not 
insurmountable for a poor family, and negligible for a rich family.  It is certainly the 
smallest fine found on Crete.  Why have such a small fee?  Perhaps the importance was 
not so much the fee itself, which could have been regarded as nominal, but rather the 
attention that came with summoning officials from Gortyn to be present in Rhitten, with 
the Rhittenian kosmos as well, in order to adjudicate the dispute – in other words, having 
publicity and/or shame in the place of a stiff financial penalty. 
  Finally, there is the issue of ksenia dika (line 8), which is applied when the 
offender is fined more than the drachma or if that drachma is not properly distributed.  I 
suspect that this is a device for limiting the jurisdiction of the agreement.  Let us assume 
that the agreement sets up a framework for a judicial action in response to a particular 
crime, i.e., a landowner who claims the profits of improvements made by the renter.  
According to the framework, the punishment for this crime is exactly one drachma, and 
this drachma must be paid to and distributed between the startos and the Rhittenians.  By 
declaring Rhitten aujtovnomo~ kai; aujtovdiko~, Gortyn has stated that it will not intervene 
in Rhittenian justice; the judicial framework in this agreement allows the Gortynians to 
do just that, but only within the context of the crime in question.  So what happens if the 
offender is fined more than one drachma, or that drachma does not go to the proper 
recipients?  Since the framework gives specific instructions about how much should be 
                                                
96M. Vickers, “Golden Greece: Relative Values, Minae, and Temple Inventories”, AJA 94 n. 4 (Oct., 
1990), 613-625, takes the values of 1 drachma per day for a skilled laborer and ½ a drachma a day for 
an unskilled laborer as a starting point for his study on Athenian relative monetary values.  I am 
assuming that variation of this value between Athens and Crete is not necessarily important to my 
argument. 
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fined and where that fine would be allocated, a new crime is created: failure on the part of 
the officials to comply with the agreement.  The crime of mismanagement is not covered 
under the judicial framework listed here -- the framework which allows Gortyn to 
intervene in Rhittenian justice despite its autonomy -- so it falls out of the agreement's 
jurisdiction.  Instead, it becomes a dispute between two separate cities, and therefore 
must be sent to ksenia dika, the means for handling cases of external jurisdiction. 
  As I had suggested before, the landowners in question may not be Gortynians but 
rather Rhittenians.  For one, having the Rhittenians as landowners would eliminate the 
problem of Rhitten as a “Polis ohne Territorium”97.  Wealthier Gortynian citizens leased 
land from Rhittenians in their territory; these groups came into conflict when the 
Gortynians invested in the land and the Rhittenian landlords wanted to enjoy the value 
added to their property.98  It may have become such a problem that the Gortynians had to 
make this agreement with the Rhittenians in order to protect their citizens' interest.  
However, as I observed above, the actual fine was not so great as the public attention that 
the process drew.  I suspect that the idea was to punish only lightly the offending 
Rhittenians, but to also discourage them from abusing their rights as landowners, and do 
so in the presence of magistrates from both cities.  Furthermore, should an official decide 
to abuse the system by fining a landowner more than the nominal drachma, he could be 
brought to trial by means of ksenia dika. 
  The advantage of this interpretation is that it makes the next stipulation the 
                                                
97Hennig 1994 331. 
98One modern analogy I had in mind was the recent example of the Uighers in China who rioted, in part 
because of the influx of Han Chinese into their region, who invested in the region but generally kept the 
good jobs and other benefits of commerce for themselves. 
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protections of the agreement as a whole (lines 8-12).  Here the identity of the parties is 
specified.  A Gortynian creditor is forbidden from exacting a security from a Rhittenian 
and, if convicted, has to pay double the “amount written” to/in/on the “pora”99; the 
Rhittenian kosmos has the responsibility of collecting the fine.  However, if he does not 
collect the fine, for whatever reason, the panel responsible for collecting (to;n~ 
preig[ivs]ton~ touvton~ pravddonta~ a[paton e[men) is immune.  Our scenario of 
Gortynian renters and Rhittenian landowners still works here: in exchange for the 
previous condition of enabling the renters to profit from improvements made to leased 
land, the Rhittenian landowners now are protected from Gortynian creditors.  The legal 
action against the aggressive creditor is much harsher than that against the unyielding 
landowner – a fine of twice the value of, perhaps, the normal Gortynian fine for unlawful 
action as a creditor – and, more tellingly, it is in the hands of the Rhittenian kosmos.  If 
the preigistai100 are Rhittenian officials, and they do not incur a legal penalty for failure 
to enforce the fine, it could be that the Gortynian government has declared itself 
indifferent to the result; in other words, the Rhittenian government has the say-so of the 
Gortynian to prosecute Gortynian citizens who break the law on this matter, but the 
                                                
99 povrai proves difficult, and the interpretations parallel those suggested for porivmo (see my note 136, p. 
75.).  Gagarin (unpublished) notes that Guarducci (1950 IC IV.80) posits “ejfovrai”, as “written upon 
the place of the ephors”; Bile (1988 171 no. 70) views it as “tax”, Van Effenterre and Ruzè 1995 as “ejn 
tài (ej)p j o[rai e[[gra]ttai” (the one at the back), but also they suggest “ejn tài jpor(iv)ai = ejn th/̀ 
ejforiva/” (at the back of the frontier).  Gagarin adds that Povra could be a place name, but only as a 
last resort.  Since there is no satisfying answer to be had, I also would like to suggest that based upon its 
role in the sentence, it seems similar to that of the diagramma in later inscriptions (the closest text is IC 
I.xvi.1 lines 36-38: timaì~ de; crhsiovmeqa taì~ ej~ to ̀diagravmmato~ to ̀tẁn Krhtaievwn a|i 
eJkavstwn e[graptai) as a way of assessing pecuniary penalties.  It would be unattested, but work in 
context. 
100Van Effenterre &  Ruzè 1995 translate them as “elders”, Perlman (unpublished) simply as a “board of 
officials”; the importance here lies not in who they are, but what they do. 
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Gortynians have also agreed not to intervene actively in the Rhittenian kosmos' course of 
action. 
 The final provision (lines 12-15) is the “amendment clause”; much like the end of 
IC III.iii.4 (lines 74-76), it describes the legal procedure to be used in the case of future 
disagreement.  The Rhittenians may bring their grievances before the Gortynians at an 
assembly session in the agora; the text says either that this is done “collectively” or with 
regard to to; koinovn.101  We know that there is a herald who is going to Rhitten, that 
there is some sort of ten day(?) limit, and that the Rhittenians and/or their representatives 
must be present in Gortyn to lodge the complaint.  The stone breaks off inconclusively, 
but based upon what we found examining other treaties, we can at least speculate upon 
the purpose of this clause: by providing a legal, non-violent forum for the Rhittenians to 
air their complaints, the Gortynians have created a way to prevent conflict, even if 
Rhitten is ultimately the weaker city. 
 Despite the difficulties in interpretation and the fact that this agreement does not 
treat the two cities as equals, it shares a number of parallels with the later Cretan judicial 
treaties.  For one thing, we have the establishment of a joint court to handle a very 
specific issue – conflicts between renters and landowners – which, without a legal forum 
for dispute settlement, could potentially create unrest in the area.  The lightness with 
which the landowners are treated, in contrast to renters, suggests that while Gortyn was 
indeed the superior city, it chose to act with care towards its dependent city.  Ultimately, 
it seems that we have one more powerful city, while acknowledging the autonomy of the 
                                                
101See my discussion below p. 50. 
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smaller, also creating a means by which a specific problem can be resolved under the 
auspices of both cities while maintaining judicial independence in other matters. 
  Thus, we can say that this agreement has this quality in common with city-to-city 
agreements such as IC III.iii.4 and, as we shall see, IC I.xvi.1; but an issue remains – 
what is ksenia dika?  The nature of this agreement seems to eliminate it as full joint 
jurisdiction between Gortyn and Rhitten.  Or perhaps it was something that functioned 
more like private arbitration, on an ad hoc basis with citizens choosing judges in the 
defendant's city, as in IC I.xvi.1.  Could it be a forerunner to koinodikion? 
  One path of inquiry not taken is that of “to; koinovn” in line 12.  The standard 
translation is as an adverbial accusative: “collectively, as a community”; a much simpler 
reading (which avoids the issue of an adverb with an article) could be taking to; koino;n 
with the preposition ajnpi- (ajmfiv): “(If) the Rhittenioi should have a dispute with the 
Gortynians about the koinon” (ajnpipaivsonti to; koino;n oij jRittevnioi porti; to;n~ 
Gortunivon[~).  The implication from this translation is that there was a koinon, and that it 
is something existing between Gortyn and Rhitten.  If we accept this (albeit without 
rashly seeking a full-blown Cretan Koinon), we come away with two options: 1) there is 
an agreement (koinon) between Gortyn and Rhitten predating this inscription or 2) this 
inscription is the koinon, i.e. common agreement.  Option 1 would mean that the two had 
a formal relationship at the time of the enactment of IC IV.80, that this inscription was 
intended to deal with a specific problem in that relationship, and that the declaration of 
Rhitten's political and judicial autonomy in line 1 was a shorter reaffirmation of an 
earlier, longer declaration; option 2 would confine the relationship between the two cities 
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to this particular legal problem.  My instinct would be towards option 1, because 
regardless of who the landowners or the renters were, these two groups were obviously 
living in close quarters and probably would have made and amended more than one 
agreement in the course of their relationship. 
  In any case, if this conjecture turns out to be correct, we are looking at a bilateral 
agreement between independent poleis known as a “koinon” as early as the Fifth Century 
– something that perhaps sets a precedent for the unusual bilateral structure of the 
Hellenistic Cretan Koinon.  In addition, the fact that these two cities make use of a bi-
jurisdictional procedure to address a potential situation of conflict suggests a precedent 
for later bilateral judicial agreements.  Perhaps the Gortyn-Knossos-centered Koinon was 
the logical outgrowth of a tradition of smaller koina, and koinodikion the outgrowth of a 
tradition of judicial procedure as an measure of interstate conflict resolution. 
 
II. IC I.xvi.1: late 3rd/early 2nd Century BCE (see Appendix, Document VI) 
 The second of these judicial inscriptions is a treaty between Gortyn and Lato that 
dates epigraphically to roughly the same period as the Chersonesos Stone102; while we 
cannot say which of these two came first, we can at least date it before the other three 
Cretan sources for the koinodikion.  The middle section is badly broken up, but at least 
what survives suggests that the whole section is judicial, in line with the better preserved 
passages that precede and follow it.  The document begins, like the Anaphe decree, with 
                                                
102 Chaniotis (1996 225) places it a few years later (ca. 219-216), as he sees the Chersonesos Stone as a 
product of the Lyttian War, and this inscription to be between the Lyttian War and the re-foundation of 
the Koinon by Philip V in 216. 
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an invocation and dating based upon the kosmoi of both cities (lines 1-5).  We are then 
told that peace has been ceremoniously declared, and that as part of this peace, there 
should be joint jurisdiction (lines 5-7).  The bulk of the document explains how this joint 
jurisdiction will operate.103  Before it does, however, it makes provisions for the 
reallocation of property seized during conflict, with land (fanerav) being attended to 
immediately and moveable goods (ajfanav) after an assessment (pràxi~).  
 One could easily imagine conflict arising from the situation portrayed here (lines 
7-9).  After all, the implication is that the two cities are trying to reset property conditions 
to their antebellum status; restoring land would, of course, be of greater concern to the 
cities as a whole, and perhaps easier to settle thanks to public records and the obvious 
fact that land cannot be hidden (made ajfanhv~).  In the case of moveable goods, it would 
be impractical for the states to handle the claims one-by-one, and probably impossible to 
locate all the owners.  For this reason, I suspect that the joint jurisdiction expounded upon 
below functions purely to sort out these property disputes, channelling what could have 
been physical vigilante acts into a legal venue that would satisfy both sides. 
 Where the case is heard and the identity of the judges appear to depend upon the 
identity of the plaintiff.  The plaintiff would be free to choose whomever he wished, 
provided that it be a citizen of the defendant’s city and that the hearing took place in that 
same city (lines 9-15).  In other words, a Gortynian could file a claim against a Latoan, 
but he had to choose another Latoan to be judge and would have to go Lato for the trial, 
and the same applied to a Latoan at Gortyn.  However, while we can be sure of the 
                                                
103 Chaniotis 1996 228. 
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judges' identity, the lines 12-14 are heavily restored; we assume that they detail the 
venue, but we cannot know for certain.  Perlman argues for the interpretation in the 
restorations (that the trial takes place in the judge's city) because she finds no precedent 
for traveling judges.104 
 While most of the middle section is missing, there appear to be stipulations 
similar to the Chersonesos Stone and IC III.iii.4 that place the duty of exacting the fine 
upon the shoulders of the kosmoi, with financial consequences for their failure to comply 
(lines 31-34).  Similar to IC III.iii.4, there is a procedure for anyone who wishes to 
prosecute the kosmos for this failure, although, this differs in that the other inscription 
was describing the prosecutorial procedure against someone who tried to destroy the 
treaty rather than against a corrupt kosmos who threatened the peace indirectly by not 
enforcing the paying of the fine.  Here, the prosecutor receives half of the two hundred-
stater fine, while the (victor's?) city receives the other half.  What is particularly 
interesting to us, however, is that the fines should be determined ej~ to ̀diagravmmato~ 
to ̀tẁn Krhtaievwn in which they were written – a clear reference to the Koinon, but in 
a treaty, like IC III.iii.4, that makes no reference to Koinon, koinodikion, or any authority 
beyond the diagramma. 
 The issue of the hypooikoi in lines 38-39 has been the subject of a few inquiries  
into the nature of dependent poleis on Crete105 and the nature of their citizenship.  As 
Perlman points out, we have two options for translating “kata; ta; aujta; de; kai; oiJ 
uJpovboikoi uJpecovntwn to; divkaion toì~ Lativoi~ Govrtuni”: “in the same way as the 
                                                
104Perlman 1996 239. 
105 Bile 1986 140; Perlman 1996 239-242. 
 54 
Latoans let the hypooikoi submit to justice at Gortyn” and “in the same way let the 
hypooikoi defend themselves from the Latoans at Gortyn.”  It seems fairly well 
established from this inscription that hypooikoi are indeed people of dependent 
communities, but one important question is whose.   
 If we look back to the conditions enumerated (and conjectured by epigraphers) in 
lines 9-14, we know that a plaintiff is allowed to choose his judge, but out of the other 
city’s citizens, and the trial is to be held in the other’s city.  A visual model of this would 
be the following: 
Plaintiff City Defendant City Judge City Venue City 
Gortyn Lato Lato Lato 
Lato Gortyn Gortyn Gortyn 
 
 Let’s apply the chart to Perlman’s translations.  The first has the hypooikoi 
submitting to justice – we assume, acting as defendant – in the same way the Latoans do, 
at Gortyn.  If the implication is that the hypooikos is being treated as a Latoan, such a 
chart would look like this: 
Gortyn Lato (dep.) Lato? Gortyn 
In other words, if the hypooikos is a dependent of Lato, the ensuing trial would not be 
within the stipulations for Latoan citizens. 
 In the second translation, the hypooikoi submit to justice from the Latoans at 
Gortyn.  This model would look like this: 
Lato Gortyn (def) Gortyn? Gortyn 
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Thus, if the hypooikoi were dependents of Gortyn, it would not alter the conditions of the 
treaty – whereas Latoan hypooikoi defending at Gortyn would require dispatching a 
Latoan judge to Gortyn under special circumstances, or else having a Gortynian choose a 
judge from his own people. 
106
  Even if Perlman is correct in saying that there is no 
precedent, Cretan or otherwise, for traveling judges107, such an alteration of 
circumstances, especially in a document designed to end hostilities and channel private 
disputes into the law-court, seems uncharacteristic and might be a further point of 
contention.  Furthermore, the need to accommodate Gortynian dependent cities probably 
reflects the reality of Gortyn as a leading city by this time in the Mesara, if not on Crete.  
Now, whether these hypooikoi were simply allied cities participating in the fight against 
Lato or simply territories directly dependent upon Gortyn108 is a question; but, as Perlman 
points out109, the participation of these dependent communities in the war against Lato 
made it important to Latoans to be able to take legal action against these hypooikoi as 
Gortynians for property stolen from Latoans during the war. 
 The reader may note that I have assumed that Lato and Gortyn are equal cities, at 
                                                
106 A final note on the philological implications of this argument: Chaniotis (1996 230) mentions some 
scholars who took the view that these were Latoan hypooikoi, not Gortynian.  I espoused this view 
myself upon first look because of my reading of uJpecovntwn to; divkaion took uJpevcw to mean “apply 
the law”, and assumed that the hypooikoi were the plaintiffs – and, by extension, would be Latoan 
because Latoan plaintiffs meet at Gortyn.  In fact, the entry in Liddell & Scott translates “uJpevcw 
divka~” as “to undergo a trial” or “pay a penalty”, and all of the entries in specifically legal contexts 
have the implication of the subject being a defendant.  While the reading that enables the hypooikoi to 
be Gortynian certainly makes historical sense, the word’s usage makes it understandable why, for 
example, Ernst Kirsten (Das dorische Kreta, Teil 1, Chicago: Ares Publishers, 1986, p. 86) posits that 
Latoan hypooikoi might be the inhabitants of Lato’s port city (kavtw povli~). 
107 Perlman 1996 239-40; she distinguishes between these and third party appeals courts (n. 39). 
108 Chaniotis 1996 231 also offers the possibility that some of the conflicts between the two cities could 
have arisen from Latoan herdsmen who, while moving their flocks from pasture to pasture, could have 
caused problems in territories affiliated with Gortyn. 
109 Perlman 1996 241. 
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least in this treaty.  In a contrasting view, Bile states that, “La seule certitude à tirer du 
texte est que, comme les Latiens, ils sont soumis à Gortyn, tout au moins en matière 
juridique”110, reading Lato as one of these hypooikoi.  The trouble with this reading is 
that it ignores the reciprocal language of the treaty, with its joint dating and the parallel 
provisions in the event of a mixed trial – more reminiscent of the equality between 
Hierapytna and Priansos (or even the Koinon and Anaphe) than the lack of parallel 
provisions of IC IV.80 between Gortyn and Rhitten.  Furthermore, the strongest argument 
against the inequality of these cities comes in the final lines of the treaty (lines 40-41) in 
which both cities are charged with publishing the treaty upon their respective Prytanies, 
suggesting – in stone, at least – equal civic institutions.  In other words, while Lato may 
be less powerful than Gortyn, the terms of this ceasefire place the two cities on equal 
footing – Lato may be lesser but it is not a hypooikos to Gortyn. 
 In conclusion, we have a “Rechtshilfevertrag” (as the German so neatly puts it) 
between Lato and Gortyn that lays out the legal procedure for the retrieval of private 
property from citizens of the other city following a war between them.  The extra section 
regarding hypooikoi is meant to allow Latoan plaintiff to prosecute inhabitants of cities 
dependent upon Gortyn who plundered while fighting on the Gortynian side.  Because of 
the lack of explicit mention of Koinon, Chaniotis, as I indicated above, places its date to 
the period just before Philip V “reestablished” the Koinon.  I suggest that this inscription 
is not necessarily dependent upon the existence of the Koinon, based upon the evidence 
of the Chersonesos Stone.  This inscription, as mentioned above, offers two options of 
                                                
110 Bile 1986 140. 
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judicial recourse to citizens of Gortyn and Knossos in peacetime: koinodikion, or “in the 
respective court which the cities should set up between each other for the adjudication of 
contracts” (lines 32-33).  I suggest that what we could have in IC I.xvi.1 would be not so 
much a judicial agreement in the absence of koinodikion (as IC III.iii.4 explicitly states) 
as one of these city-by-city agreements that work as a peacetime alternative to 
koinodikion.  While there could well be arguments against this idea, at the very least, we 
can probably see IC I.xvi.1 as a predecessor to the sort of state-by-state judicial 




 Koinodikion is rare word with only a few attestations; this fact hinders a complete 
knowledge of how a koinodikion functions or even how it is comprised, but it also helps 
because it can be the subject of such a small study as this one.  The translation we most 
often accept is “shared” or “joint tribunal”, but even this does not provide all the 
information. 
 We began by examining the four Cretan texts that attest to its usage.  These are 
concentrated around the last quarter of the third century BCE and the first half of the 
second century BCE.  The Anaphe asylia decree (IC IV.197) showed that koinodikion 
was a judicial venue closely linked to the Koinon, but did not entirely answer the 
question of whether it was to function as the all-Cretan option for pirate prosecution, as 
opposed to the Anaphaian court, or whether it was a joint court of Anaphaians and 
Cretans.  As we saw, the other Cretan usages suggest the former, but in my opinion, the 
matter might still be open for discussion. 
 The Hierapytna-Priansos symbolon (IC III.iii.4) attests to the absence of 
koinodikion; the two cities set up a court to adjudicate all of the disputes (except those 
that could first be settled by arbitration) that arose between their citizens since the 
koinodikion ended (lines 58-62).  They also provided for the adjudication of future 
disputes by establishing a court that also had an appeal process to a third, neutral city 
(lines 67-8).  While the agreement reflects the staying power of the diagramma – an 
institution that is associated with the Koinon but need not dependent upon the Koinon – 
the inscription shows that koinodikion was a court for cases of mixed jurisdiction. 
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 Polybius 22.19.1-5 presented an episode from 184 BCE in which the Romans 
arbitrated disputes on Crete.  Besides handling the cases of Gortyn and Knossos' mutual 
harassment, the Roman Appius Claudius also ordered Kydonia to stay out of Cretan 
affairs if it did not choose to take part in koinodikion.  Here, acceptance of koinodikion 
would have appeased the Cretan cities whom Kydonia had upset (most importantly, 
Gortyn and Knossos); furthermore, lack of acceptance would have signalled an 
unwillingness to partake of the preventative measure associated with koinodikion, and 
would have made Kydonia “un-Cretan” in the eyes of those other Cretans who had 
accepted it. 
 Chaniotis' Chersonesos Stone recorded a bilateral agreement between Gortyn and 
Knossos, with their allies.  The agreement was probably meant to last beyond the original 
circumstances, because it had stipulations for how to perform the requisite oaths (Side B 
lines 22-24) and multi-jurisdictional adjudication (Side B lines 27-32) in times of both 
war and peace.  From here, we learned that in peacetime, Cretan citizens prosecuting 
fellow citizens (presumably those unable to have their case heard at home, such as a 
private citizen prosecuting a kosmos) or citizens from other cities have two options, 
koinodikion, or one of the bilateral courts established by two cities on an ad hoc basis.  
We could posit, then, that koinodikion was something separate from a bilateral agreement 
such as IC III.iii.4, but that it also owed its existence to the alliance of Gortyn and 
Knossos – and by extension, the Cretan Koinon – and could not function in wartime. 
 We then looked at three attestations of koinodikion from outside of Crete.  These 
had a larger date range, with four Ptolemaic papyri (Guéraud 11, 43, 66, and 70) from 
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221 BCE, an arbitration letter of Eumenes II of Pergamon to the Teians and the Guild of 
the Dionysian Artists (Welles #53) from c. 170-160 BCE, and a seal-stone found on 
Delos dating to 127 BCE (Boussac).  From the Egyptian e[nteuxi~ (petition) letters, we 
observed that koinodikion filled the judicial gap between the native Egyptian courts and 
the Macedonian circuit courts, but eventually fell out of use as the language of the 
contract rather than the litigants' ethnicity became the deciding factor in jurisdiction.  We 
thus noted koinodikion's bilateral quality, but concluded that the identities of the litigants 
did not necessarily guarantee us knowing how the court was composed, i.e. whether the 
judge(s) was/were Greek or Egyptian or both. 
 The arbitration letter to Teos and the Dionysian Guild also demonstrated the 
bilateral nature of koinodikion, since it adjudicated between two groups that were 
autonomous.  As with the Egyptian sources, this inscription did not inform us of the 
court's composition, but it did show the validity of the court being challenged on the 
grounds of faulty oaths. 
 The Delos seal-stone only provided enough information to speculate upon the 
spread of koinodikion.  It was the most recent of any of the sources in this study; if 
Boussac's interpretation is entirely correct, it would mean that koinodikion probably 
spread through cultural contact with Egypt.  On the other hand, it seems more likely that 
the Teian usage came from Crete, although the bilateral Teian koinodikion is probably 
closer in nature to the bilateral agreement between Hierapytna and Priansos than the 
common court in the Chersonesos Stone. 
 Finally, we examined two somewhat earlier Cretan inscriptions – IC IV.80 from 
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the fifth century BCE and IC I.xvi.1 from the late third century (around the same time as 
the Chersonesos Stone).  While neither of these mentioned koinodikion, both were 
examples of intercity judicial treaties. 
 IC IV.80, an agreement between Gortyn and Rhitten, began by recognizing the 
autonomy of the Rhittenians, but then set up a procedure for the Gortynians to handle 
specific renter/landowner conflicts (lines 3-4) that involved citizens from each of the 
cities.  The final clause (lines 12-15), with its emendation procedure, may possibly refer 
to the arrangement between Gortyn and Rhitten as to; koino;n(line 12); if this is so, then 
we have a cultural context not only for bilateral judicial agreements, but also for 
koinonitself as a bilateral agreement. 
 Finally, we examined IC I.xvi.1, a treaty between Gortyn and Lato that 
established a procedure for citizens to sue for goods seized during the previous war.  
Plaintiffs could choose their judges, but these had to be from among the defendant's 
fellow citizens; besides prosecuting Gortynians, Latoans also had a clause allowing them 
to sue Gortynian hypooikoi, (dependent?) communities that had aided Gortyn in the war 
against Lato.  This agreement corresponds to the second option in the Chersonesos 
Stone's peace-time provisions, and sets the stage for the arrangement in IC III.iii.4. 
 
 From all of this, what can we conclude about koinodikion?  First of all, it is by 
nature a venue for litigants of different jurisdictions that are autonomous communities.  
Second, it is one of the many techniques for conflict prevention that is used in many of 
these agreements.  We can also conclude that while Crete shares a tradition of bilateral 
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courts with Egypt (and may have influenced Teos), koinodikion on Crete has a distinct 
association with the Koinon, and acceptance of it symbolizes accession to the will of 
Gortyn and Knossos, while rejection means that one is “un-Cretan”, and rejects the 
possibilities offered by koinodikion for judicial conflict mediation. 
 We do not know for certain how the koinodikion was organized; the litigants may 
be from different communities, but there could be one or more judge, and these might not 
necessarily represent the communities of the litigants.  More importantly, we do not 
know how often it took place or how effective it was.  It is, after all, only referred to in 
these ten instances; in Egypt it is confined to evidence from 221 BCE, in Teos to one 
instance during the 160s BCE, and to four instances from Crete over a fifty-year period, 
and then only when Gortyn and Knossos were allied.  Was it truly an option for Cretans?  
Or was it mentioned for its association with the diagramma tẁn Krhtaievwn, something 
that seems to have had authority regardless of the political existence of the Koinon? 
 Ultimately, koinodikion was a diplomatic tool: it represented a means for conflict 
prevention through dispute resolution between communities that might otherwise erupt 
into more serious kinds of conflicts.  On Crete, it had the additional quality of 
representing a Cretan tradition; the people of Hierapytna and Priansos would have 
accepted koinodikion had it been available, but in its absence, they still acknowledged its 
authority and held the diagramma as a standard in common.  By not accepting 
koinodikion, Kydonia would have rejected that common standard.  The Cretans may have 
been notoriously bellicose, but by recording instances of koinodikion and bilateral 
intercity judicial agreements, they demonstrate a desire to reduce the potentiality of war 
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through the application of legal procedure. 
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Appendix: Sources and Translations 
 
I. IC iv.197 
 
[e[dox]e toì~ sunevdroi~ kai; tw[̀i] 
[koinẁ]i tẁn Krhtaiewn, Knw- 
[soì ej] tẁi sunlovgwi, kormi- 
[ovntw] ejn Govrtuni me;n ej- 
[pi; tẁ]n Dumavnwn tẁn su;n       5 
[….]ivwi twì jAllodavmw 
[o{ka t]o; deuvteron, mhno;~ 
[Kar]nhviw tetravdi, Knwso[ì] 
[de; ej]pi; tẁn Aijqalevwn ko[r]- 
[miovnt]wn tẁn su;n Kuyevlw[i]       10 
[tẁi ...]revtw, mhno;~ jAguhv[i]- 
[w tetrav]di: a[sulon h\men [ jA]- 
[nafaivw]n ta;n povlin ka[i;] 
[ta;n cwvr]an kaqw;~ kai; to; [iJ]- 
[ero;n uJ]parcei a[sulon        15 
[tẁi tẁ k]oinẁ tẁn Krhta[i]- 
[evwn rJh]tẁi. eij dev tiv~ ti- 
[na sulav]shi jAnafaivwn tẁn 
[ejk Krhvt]a~ oJrmiomevnwn 
[h] ejk t]à~ povlew~ h] ejk t[à~]       20 
[cwvra]~, uJpovdiko~ e[stw [div]- 
[kan e[n] te jAnafaivoi[~] 
[a{n k j a]ujt[o]i; prostavxw[nti], 
[k j ejn k]oinodikivwi ajpr[ovdi]- 
[kon k j ajp]avrbolon kai; k[u]-       25 
[riva aJ] pràxi~ e[stw ka;t [to;] 
[diavgr]amma. 
 
It was resolved by the councilmen111 and by the 
koinon of the Cretans, with the meeting 
at Knossos, while at Gortyn those being kosmoi 
were of the Dymanes with 
-----ios son of Allodamos 
for the second time (?), on the 4th day 
of the month of Carneios, and at Knossos 
                                                
111 sunevdroi~ 
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those being kosmoi were of 
the Aethaleis with Kypselos 
son of -----retos, on the 4th day of the 
month of Agyeios: let the city and countryside 
of the Anapheians be inviolate, just as 
the shrine is already involate 
by the decree from the koinon 
of the Cretans.  If someone  
of those sailing out from Crete 
should violate one of the Anapheians 
either from the city or from the 
countryside, let him be liable for 
trial among the Anapheians, 
whatever (trial)112 they should prescribe for him, 
and in koinodikion (let him be?) without  
preliminary hearing and without prosecutional  
deposit113 and let the action of recovery114 




II. IC III.iii.4 
 
[q]eo;~ ajgaq[ov~]. 
ajgaqài tuvcai kai; ejpi; swthrivai, ejpi; kovsm[wn ejn me;n] 
JIerapuvtnai tẁn su;n jEnivpanti tẁ JErmai>vw m[hno;~] 
JImalivw, ejn de; Priansioì ejpi; kovsmwn tẁn su;[n Nevwni tẁ] 
Cimavrw kai; mhno;~ Dromhivw. Vac. tavde sunevqe[nto kai; suneu]- 
dovkhsan ajllavloi~ JIerapuvtnioi kai; Priavnsioi [ejmmenon]-   5 
te~ ejn taì~ prou>parcwvsai~ stavlai~ ijdivai te [tài keimevnai] 
Gortunivoi~ kai; JIerapunivoi~ kai; tài kata; koino;n [Gortunivoi~] 
kai; JIeraputnivoi~ kai; Priansivoi~ kai; ejn tài filivai [kai; summa]- 
civai kai; o{rkoi~ toì~ progegonovsi ejn tauvtai~ t[aì~ povlesi]  10 
kai; ejpi tài cwvrai a|i eJkavteroi e[conte~ kai; kratovn[te~ ta;n sun]- 
qhvkan e[qento ej~ to;n pavnta crovnon. vac. JIeraputn[ivoi~] 
kai; Priansivo<i>~ h\men par j ajllavloi~ ijsopoliteivan kai; ejpiga- 
miva~ kai; e[nkthsin kai; metoca;n kai; qeivwn kai; ajnqrwpivnwn 
pavntwn, o{soi ka e[wnti e[mfuloi par j eJkatevroi~, kai; pwlovn-  15 
                                                
112 uJpovdiko~ e[stw (divkan e[n) te Anafaivoi(~) (a{n k« a)ujt(o)i; prostavxwnti 
113 ajpr(ovdikon k« ajp)avrbolon: is this adverbial? Reflects the subject? Could it describe koinodikion? 
114 aJ pràxi~ 
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ta~ kai; wjnwmevno~ kai; daneivzonta~ kai; daneizomevno~ 
kai; ta\lla pavnta sunallavssonta~ kurivo~ h\men kata; 
to;~ uJpavrconta~ par j eJkatevroi~ novmo~. vac. ejxevstw de tẁi 
te JIeraputnivwi speivren ejn tài Priansivai kai; tẁi Prian- 
sieì ejn tài JIeraputnivai didẁsi ta; tevlea kaqavper oiJ a[lloi  20 
polìtai kata; to;~ novmo~ to;~ eJkatevrh keimevno~. vac. eij dev tiv 
ka oJ JIerapuvtnio~ uJpecqhtai ej~ Privans{i}on h] oJ Priansieu;~ 
ej~ JIeravputan oJtiouǹ, ajteleva e[stw kai; ejsagomevnwi kai; 
ejxagomevnwi aujta; kai; touvtwn to;~ karpo;~ kai; kata; gàn 
kai; kata; qavlassan: w|n dev ka ajpodẁtai kata; qavlassan ejwv-  25 
sa~ ejxagwgà~ tẁn uJpecqesivmwn ajpodovtw ta; tevlea 
kata; to;~ novmo~ to;~ eJkatevrh keimevno~. vac. kata; taujta; de; 
kai; ei[ tiv~ ka nevm[hi ajte]lh;~ e[stw: aij dev ka sivnhtai ajpoteisav- 
tw ta; ejpitivmia. [oJ] si[nov]meno~ kata; to;~ novmo~ to;~ eJkatevrh kei- 
mevno~. preighvia de; w| [k]a creivan e[chi porhivw parecovntwn  30 
oiJ me;n JIerapuvtnioi kovsmoi toì~ Prianseus̀i, oiJ de; Priansiev<e>~ 
kovsmoi toì~ JIeraputnivoi~: aij de; mh; parivscaien, ajpoteisavn- 
twn oiJ ejpivdamoi tẁn kovsmwn tài preigeivai strathr̀a~ devka. 
oJ de; kovsmo~ oJ tẁn JIeraputnivwn eJrpevtw ejn Priansioì ej~ 
to; ajrceìon kai; ejn ejkklhsivai kaqhvsqw meta; tẁn kovsmwn,  35 
wJsauvtw~ de; kai; oJ tẁn Priansievwn kovsmo~ eJrpevtw ejn JIe- 
rapuvtnai ej~ to; ajrceìon kai; ejn ejkklhsivai kaqhvsqw meta; 
tẁn kovsmwn. ejn de; toì~ JHraivoì~ kai; ejn taì~ a[llai~ eJortaì~ 
oiJ paratugcavnonte~ eJrpovntwn par j ajllavlo~ ej~ ajdrhvi- 
on kaqw;~ kai; oiJ a[lloi polìtai. ajnaginwskovntwn de; ta;n   40 
sta;lan kat j ejniauto;n oiJ tovk j ajei; kosmovnte~ par j eJkatev 
roi~ ejn toì~ Juperbwvioi~ kai; proparaggelovntwn ajllav- 
loi~ pro; aJmeràn devka h[ ka mevllwnti ajnaginwvsken. 
oJpoìoi dev ka mh; ajnagnẁnti h] mh; paragghvlwnti ajpo- 
teisavntwn oiJ ai[tioi touvtwn stathr̀a~ eJkatovn, oiJ me;n   45 
JIerapuvtioi kovsmoi tẁn Priansievwn tài povlei, oiJ de; 
Priansieve~ JIeraputnivwn tài povlei. Vac. aij dev ti~ ajdikoivh 
ta; sunkeivmena koinài dialuvwn h] kovsmo~ h] ijdiwvta~, ej- 
xevstw tẁi bwlomevnwi dikavxasqai ejpi; tẁ koinẁ di- 
kasterivw tivmama ejpigrayavmenon tà~ divka~ kata; to;   50 
ajdivkhma o{ kav ti~ ajdikhvshi: kai; ei[ ka nikavshi, labevtw to; 
trivton mevro~ tà~ divka~ oJ dikaxavmeno~, to; de; loipo;n e[s- 
tw tàn povlewn. aij dev ti qeẁn bwlomevnwn e{loimen ajga- 
qo;n ajpo; tẁn polemivwn, h] koinài exodouvsante~ h] idivai ti- 
ne;~ par j eJkatevrwn h] kata; gàn h] kata; qavlassan, lan-   55 
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canovntwn eJkavteroi kata; to;~ a[ndra~ to;~ e{rponta~ 
kai; ta;~ dekavta~ lambanovntwn eJkavteroi ej~ ta;n ijdiv- 
an povlin. uJpe;r de; tẁn progegonovtwn par j eJkatevroi~ 
ajdikhmavtwn ajf jw| to; koinodivkion ajpevlipe crovnw, poih- 
savsqwn ta;n diexagwga;n oiJ su;n jEnivpanti kai; Nevwni kov[s]-  60 
moi ejn w|i ka koinài dovxhi dikasthrivw/ ajmfotevrai~ taì~ pov- 
lesi ejp j aujtẁn kosmovntwn kai; to;~ ejgguvo~ katastasavn- 
twn uJpe;r touvtwn ajf ja|~ ka aJmevra~ aJ stavla teqhì ejm mh- 
niv. uJpe;r de; tẁn u{steron ejgginomevnwn ajdikhmavtwn pro- 
divkwi me;n crhvsqwn kaqw;~ to; diavgramma e[cei: peri; de; tẁ  65 
dikasthrivw oiJ ejpistavmenoi kat j ejniauto;n par j eJkatevroi~ 
kovsmoi povlin stanuevsqwn a{g ka ajmfotevrai~ taì~ povles[i] 
[dov]xhi ejx a\~ to ejpikrithvrion tevletai, kai; ejgguvo~ kaqistavn- 
twn ajf j a|~ ka aJmevra~ ejpistànti ejpi to; ajrceìon ejn dimhvnwi, 
kai; diexagovntwn taut̀a ejp j aujtẁn kosmovntwn kata; to;   70 
docqe;n koinài suvmbolon. aij de; ka mh; poihvswnti oiJ kovsmoi ka- 
qw;~ gevgraptai, ajpoteisavtw e{kasto~ aujtẁn stathr̀a~ 
penthvkonta, oiJ me;n JIerapuvtnioi kovsmoi Priansivwn tài povlei 
oiJ de; Priavnsioi kovsmoi JIeraputnivwn tài povlei. aij dev tiv ka 
dovxhi ajmfotevrai~ taì~ povlesi bwlouomevnai~ ejpi; tẁi   75 
koinài sumfevronti diorqwvsasqai, kuvrion e[stw to; dior- 
qwqevn. stasantwn de; ta;~ stavla~ oiJ ejnestakovte~ ej- 
katevrhi kovsmoi ejp j aujtẁn kosmovntwn, oiJ mevn JIerapuv- 
tnioi ejn tẁi iJerẁi ta~̀ jAqanaiva~ tà~ Poliavdo~ kai; oiJ 
Priavnsioi enj tẁi iJerẁi tà~ jAqanaiva~ tà~ Poliavdo~.   80 
oJpovteroi dev ka mh; stavswnti kaqw;~ gevgraptai ajpo- 




For good fortune and preservation, (in the year) when the kosmoi for the 
Hierapytnians were those with Enipas son of Hermaios in the month 
of Himalios, and (in the year when) the kosmoi for the Priansians were those with Neon 
son of Chimaros in the month of Dromeios. vac The Hierapytnians and Priansians 5 
established these things and concluded them together, abiding in the preexisting stelae 
(this one, and those set up by the Gortynians  
and the Hierapytnians and those set up according in common115 by the Gortynians and the 
Hierapytnians and the Priansians), and in their friendships  
and alliances and earlier oaths between these cities      10 
and on the condition of the territories that each possesses and controls,  
                                                
115 kata; koinovn 
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they set up the treaty for all time. vac Let there be between the Hierapytnians  
and the Priansians common citizenship116, the privilege of legal intermarriage117,  
the right to acquire property118, and joint possession119 of all things pertaining to gods  
and man, as many as the phylai from each may take part in, and let the rights to sell 15  
and buy and loan and borrow and  
engage in all other transactions have authority according  
to the law that already exists for each. vac Let it be possible for a  
Hierapytnian to sow seed on Priansian territory and a Priansian  
on Hierapytnian, provided they pay taxes just as the other     20 
citizens do according to the law established by each. vac If a  
Hierapytnian deposits something for re-export in Priansos or a Priansian  
does likewise in Hierapytna, let it remain free of taxes for him importing  
and exporting these things and their produce by land and  
by sea; on those things that were deposited for reexport that he will sell sold by sea 25  
with export being permitted, let him pay the tax  
according to the law established by each. vac Similarly,  
if someone should pasture, let him be tax-free; but if he should do damage120 let  
the one damaging pay the assessed fine according to the law established  
by each.  When an embassy should have need of a conveyance(?)121, let the  30 
Hierapytnian kosmoi provide it to the Priansians, and the Priansian  
to the Hierapytnians; if they do not provide it, let those of the kosmoi who  
are sojourning there122 pay ten staters for the embassy.   
Let the kosmos of the Hierapytnians among the Priansians go into  
the magisterial hall and let him sit in the assembly with the kosmoi,   35 
and in the same way let the [kosmos] of the Priansians among the  
Hierapytnians go into the magisterial hall and let him sit in the assembly with  
the kosmoi.  Let those present at the festival of Hera and  
other festivals on either side enter the andreion  
just as the other citizens do.  Let those in the office of kosmos at that point  40 
read out the stele to each other during the Hyperboia  
and let them announce to each other  
ten days before that they intend to read it out.   
Whichever do not read it out or announce it,  
let those guilty of these pay one hundred staters, the     45 
Hierapytnian [kosmoi] to the city of the Priansians, the  
Priansian to the city of the Hierapytnians. vac If anyone, whether kosmos or 
private citizen, should commit a wrong by destroying the common co-establishment,  






121 preighvia de; w| (k)a cfeivan e[chi porhivw parecovntwn 
122 oiJ ejpivdamoi; Chaniotis: anwesenden 
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let it be possible for someone who is willing to prosecute before the common  
court123, with the penalty of the verdict being prescribed according    50 
to the crime which someone might commit; if he should prevail, let the prosecutor  
take a third of the fine money, and let the remaining share  
be for the cities.  If, gods willing, we should seize some wealth  
from enemies, either campaigning in common or as some private individuals  
from each city, whether by land or by sea, let each take     55 
an allotment according to the men coming along  
and let each take a tithe to his  
own city.  With regard to preexisting injuries against each other  
from the time when the koinodikion stopped124, let the kosmoi  
with Enipas and Neon make a trial(?)125       60 
in whichever court126 is agreed upon in common by both cities  
in the presence of their kosmoi and let the securities be established  
with regard to these things within a month of the day on which the stele  
was set up.  With regard to injuries that might arise later,  
let them employ a preliminary hearing as the diagramma stipulates; concerning the 65 
dikasterion, let those in the office of kosmos for each year in each [city]  
appoint a city which is pleasing to both cities  
from which the appellate court127 will be constituted, and let them set up a  
security within two months from the day they published it at the magisterial hall128,  
and let them try(?)129 these cases in the presence of the kosmoi according to the  70 
agreement decided upon in common.130  If the kosmoi should not do these things as  
it is written131, let each of them pay fifty  
staters, the Hierapytnian kosmoi to the city of the Priansians,  
the Priansian kosmoi to the city of the Hierapytnians.  If something  
should be pleasing to both cities, desirous       75 
of a common benefit, to amend132, let the emendation have authority.   
Let those incumbent as kosmoi in each during  
their respective kosmos terms set up stelai, the  
Hierapytnians in the shrine of Athena Polias and the  
Priansians in the shrine of Athena Polias.       80 
Whichever do not set them up as it is written,  
let them pay the same fine as it is written  
                                                
123 ejpi; tẁ koinẁ dikasthrivw 
124 ajf« w| to; koinodivkion ajpevlipe crovnw 
125 diexagwghv: trial, settlement, inquiry 
126 ejn w|i ka koinài dovxhi dikasthrivw/ 
127 to; ejpikrithvrion 
128 ajf; a|~ ka aJmevra~ ejpistànti ejpi; to; ajrceìon enj dimhvnwi 
129 diexagovntwn 




concerning such cases(?)133. 
 
 
III. Polybius 22.19.1-5 
 
{Oti kata; th;n Krhvthn, kosmouǹto~ ejn Gortuvnh/ Kuvda toù jAntavkou~, kata; 
pavnta trovpon ejlattouvmenoi Gortuvnioi tou;~ Knwsivou~, ajpotemovmenoi th~̀ 
cwvra~ aujtẁn to; me;n kalouvmenon Lukavstion prosevneiman JRaukivoi~, to; de; 
Diatovnion Luttivoi~. kata; de; to;n kairo;n tout̀on paragenomevnwn presbeutẁn 
ejk th~̀ JRwvmh~ eij~ th;n Krhvthn tẁn peri; to;n [Appion cavrin tou ̀dialus̀ai ta;~ 
ejnestwvsa~ aujtoì~ pro;~ ajllhvlou~ diaforav~, kai; poihsamevnwn lovgou~ uJpe;r 
touvtwn ejn th/̀ Knwsivwn kai; Gortunivwn, peisqevnte~ oiJ Krhtaieì~ ejpevtreyan 
ta; kaq j auJtou;~ toì~ peri; to;n [Appion. oiJ de; {peisqevnte~} Knwsivoi~ me;n 
ajpokatevsthsan th;n cwvran, Kudwniavtai~ de; prosevtaxan tou;~ me;n oJmhvrou~ 
ajpolabeìn, ou}~ ejgkatevleipon dovnte~ toì~ peri; Carmivwna provteron, th;n de; 
Falavsarnan ajfeiǹai mhde;n ejx aujth~̀ nosfisamevnou~. peri; de; tẁn kata; 
koinodivkion sunecwvrhsan aujtoì~ boulomevnoi~ me;n {aujtoì~} ejxeìnai metevcein, 
mh; boulomevnoi~ de; kai; tout̀ j exeìnai, pavsh~ ajpecomevnoi~ th~̀ a[llh~ Krhvth~ 
aujtoì~ te kai; toì~ ejk Falasavrnh~ fugavsin. 
 
On Crete, while Kydas son of Antakles was kosmos in Gortyn, the Gortynians were 
seeking by any means to weaken the Knossians, and having divided off a portion of their 
territory, they alloted the portion called Lykastion to the Raukians, and the part called 
Diatonion to the Lyctians.  At that time, the ambassadorial party of Appius from Rome to 
Crete was present in order to settle existing differences between them and, when they had 
addressed these in Knossos and Gortyn, the Cretans were persuaded to turn them over to 
Appian’s embassy.  They restored the territory to the Knossians, and ordered the 
Kydonians to take back the hostages whom they had left with Charmion before and to 
leave Phalasarna without despoiling it.  With regard matters of koinodikion, were 
permitted to participate, or to refuse if they did not wish, on the condition that they and 








[-3-].o~ Krhtikẁ s[tathr- ---------18---------] 
[-3-]on enivwnti oiJ DI[------------24------------] 
                                                
133 peri; tẁn dikaivwn 
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[-2-] DE dikattevsqw E[----------22-23----------]      4 
[-3 ]I aijtiattomevnw[?----------20-21----------] 
N k[ai;] tẁi kruvponti kai; UG[--------20-21----------k]- 
atakriqhì uJpo; tẁn pliovn[wn----------20----------] 
no~ ajpoteisavtw uJpe;r eJka[st- --------17-18-----------s]-    8 
tathr̀a~ eJkato;n penthvkon[ta-------15------] 
rhi ajnfi; ta~̀ tripleiva~ tẁi DI[-------16-------s]- 
tathr̀a~ penthvkonta o{~ kai; PRA[-------15-16-------] 
ON ka prosstavsetai trovpwi w|i ka lI[------13-----ouJ]-   12 
riskhtai. kata; me;n to;n po;lemon EGD[------12-13------] 
la aujtomolikav kaq j ijrhvnan de; ejpi; tẁi P//[------12-13---o{] 
~ ka ajfevlhtai, nikevsqw ta;~ hjgravmmena~ [--8-9--di]- 
agravnmati ta~ ajfailevsio~ diplovo~ EPID.[-----9----]    16 
DADROMAIWI kata; to; diavgranma w|n dev ka ka[----8----] 
oiJ ejreutai; kai; pratovntwn touvto~ aujtoi; kata; to;[---7---] 
kai; exaposstellovntwn to; ajrguvrion ejn aJmevrai~ E[---6---] 
ej~ ta;n povlin ejx a|~ k jh\i oJ aujtovmolo~ peri; w| ka aJ dika h\[i].  20 
eij dev ka mh; oujrivskwnti crhvmata o{pw pravxonti aujtoN[--4--] 
nte~ ejsdovntwn to;n katakrivqenta. eij de; ka mhd j aujto;n d[uvn] 
antai ejlèn aJ povli~ ajpottinuovntwn ta;n katavdikon, oiJ de; 
kovsmoi ajpodidovntwn ej~ tàn politikàn prosovdwn ajttav-   24 
mioi ijovnten kai; ajnupovdikoi kai; mhvdeni e[nocoi politikẁi 
novmwi. eij de oiJ kovsmoi mh; ejsapodoìen aujtoi; ojfhlovntwn t- 
o; diplovon kai; oJ bwlovmeno~ tẁn ejreutàn kai; tẁn ijdiwtàn 
pratevssqw e}kaston to; kata; mevro~ kai; ta;n me;n katavdik-  28 
on ejxapodidovtw toì~ ajdikiomevnoi~, to; de; ejpivtimon aujto;~ 
ejcevtw: kata; ta; aujta; de; h|men ta;n pràxin tẁn hjgrammevnw- 




[--------16--------]ASI tẁn Krhtaievw[n ------13------] 
[----------19----kat]avdiko~ oiJ ejreutai; I[-------13------]    4 
[----------19---------] de; tàn katadivkwn ta[-----9----] 
[---------17-------uJ]pe;r tẁn aujtomovlwn k[ ; --6-7--] 
[----------19---------].WDE kai; toì~ dikatto[mevnoi~--] 
[-----------21---------a]ujta; ajsfavleia ka.[----8----]     8 
[-----------20----------]inomevnoi~: ejpi; de; toi[~ sunkeimevnoi~] 
[-------telesavntwn to;]n uJpo; gegrammevnon o{rk[on---6--] 
[---------18--------- oJ]rkixavntwn de; to;~ me;n K[nwsivo~ -2-3-] 
[Gortuvnioi ejparwvmenoi k]ai; ta;~ gunaìka~ kai; ta; t[evkna -3-4-]  12 
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[aujtẁn kai; ta; crhmat  ]A to;~ de; Gortunivo~ oJ Knwv[sioi oiJ] 
[---------17---------]wn suvnmaco~ ojrkixavntwn [---6---] 
[-------14-------pre]ighvia~ ajpossthvlante~ ejpi; TA.[-3-] 
[---ejn hJmevra~ tri]avkonta ajf« a{~ a{de aJ su<n>qhvka kekuvrwtai.  16 
[-------13------ta;]n uJpogegrammevnan ejpara;n kata; povlin O[---] 
[-------14-------] tẁn sunkeimevnwn H ka telesqhì oJ o{rko~ SUN 
[------12------p]olivta~: oiJ me;n Gortuvnioi parivonsa[~] Knwsivwn 
[preighiva~ oiJ de; K]nwvsioi Gortunivwn.  oiJ de; suvnmacoi Gortuni;wn 20 
[----9-10----]I: qevntwn de; kai; oiJ tovk« aijei; kovsmoi ta;n aujta;n ejpara;n 
[kaq je{kas]to;n ejniauto;n kata; me;n to;n povlemon katiovntwn tẁn 
[o]rkistàn, kaq jiJrhvnan de; parivonsa~ preighiva~ ejn tai ̀prativstai 
[ej]nnovmwi ejsklhsivai proanagnovnte~ ta;n sunqhvkan: eij de; mh aj-  24 
navgnoien ta;n sunqhvkan h[ ta;n ejpara;n m[h;] qe[ìen] aujtoi; e[nocoi e[n- 
twn tài eparài uJpe;r qiẁn: dikattesqw eJni; eJkavstiw tẁ kovr- 
mw krhtivkw stathvrwn cilivwn. kata; me;n to;n povlemon polivta~ 
tw; kovrmw ejpi; dikasthrivw w| ka koiv a[lloi polivtai peri; tẁn port j a- 28 
ujsauto~ sunbolaivwn diexavgwn[ti] to; divkaion: kaq jiJrhvnan de; 
oJ lhivwn tẁn Krhtaievwn k[ai;] polivta~ polivtai kai; xhǹo~ xhnẁi h] ejn 
tẁi koinodikivw/ h] kat ja[ eJkavstwi aij povlee~ port j ajllavla~ peri; t- 
à~ dikaiodosiva~ sunqivwntai suvnbola. ajngravyai de; tavnde ta;n su[n]- 32 
qhvkan kai; to;n o{rkon kai; ta;n ejpara;n estavlan livqinan kai; qevmen 
Gortuvnio~ me;n ej~ to; iJaro;n tẁ jApovllwno~ tw; Putiwv. vacat 
 
FACE A 
……..let him pay (?)……………………... 
…Cretan staters………………….. 
…for him entering, the (judges?)…………………. 
..let him be tried/judged…………............      4 
…for/of the accused people……………… 
N and for the one hiding and UG……………. 
has been convicted by the majority……….. 
let him pay on behalf of each…………….      8 
150 staters…………… 
…with regard to the threefold (penalty?) for the….. 
50 staters.  Whoever also (makes a transaction?)…. 
let him arrange it in whichever way ….      12 
is found.  In wartime EGD…….. 
the matter? of desertion; in peacetime, on the (first month?) 
(whoever) is robbed, let the laws prevail (?) (according to)  
the diagramma, a double portion of the stolen amount    16 
[dadromai] according to the diagramma, of [de ka ka-]…….. 
Let the debt collectors and they themselves provide these things according to [the 
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diagramma?] 
And let them send the money away within (20?) days……. 
into the city from which the deserter came whom the suit is about   20 
If they do not discover the property whence they provided it, 
let them lodge information against the convicted party; if they are not able to seize him, 
let the city(?) pay the fine, let the 
kosmoi pay back into the public treasury, and let them be    24 
free from punishment and not liable for any action and not liable 
to public law.  If the kosmoi should not pay, let them owe 
double and let any willing person, either from the debt collectors or private citizens, 
file a suit of redemption against each according to the share and    28 
let him mete out the conviction to the wrongdoers; let him keep 





……………………of the Cretans…………… 
……………………..wrong-doer(?) (Let) the debt collectors…………  4 
……………………..of the fine………………. 
…………………..on behalf of the deserters and……… 
…………………ŌDE and for those bringing cases……….. 
………………….the same security, and…………     8 
………………….INOMENOIS; concerning the [things set up together]…….. 
[let them accomplish the] underwritten oath……. 
……………..let [the Gortynians, having made the curse] administer the oath for the 
[Knossians] to take 
……………..[on their] wives and [children]……..     12 
[and their property] and let the Knossians administer the oath to the Gortynians… 
………….let them administer the oath to the allies…… 
………….sending out embassies concerning TA… 
……...[within] (thirty) days from that from which the treaty has had authority. 16 
……………the underwritten curse city by city O… 
…………….of the things agreed upon or let the oath accomplish SUN 
………..citizens; let the Gortynians with the [embassies] of the Knossians present 
………[and the] Knossians [with the embassies of the] Gortynians.  [Let] the allies of the  
Gorynians          20 
……….I; let the incumbent kosmoi make the same curse 
each year, in wartime, with the oath-takers being present, 
in peacetime, with embassies being present in the first 
offical assembly, publicizing the agreement; if they should not   24 
read out the agreement or should not make the curse, [let] them be liable 
to the curse from the gods; let each kosmos by fined individually 
a thousand Cretan staters.  In wartime, let them dispose citizens 
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in the kosmos’ court just as the other citizens do with contracts   28 
between each other in court; in peacetime, 
a member of the Cretans, either a citizen against a fellow citizen or citizens of two 
different cities, either in 
the koinodikion or in the respective court which the cities should set up between each 
other for the adjudication of contracts.  May the Gortynian publicly inscribe the 32 
agreement and the oath and the curse on a stone stele and let 




V. IC IV.80 (Van Effenterre & Ruzé #7) 
 
Qioiv.  jEpi; toid̀e [ jR]i[ttevn]i[oi G]or[tunivoi~ aujt]ovnom[o]i jk aujtovdikoi vac. ta; q[uv- 
mata parevkonte~ ej~ Bivdan triv[t]oi [ϝev]tei triakativon~ (s)[t]ater̀an~ kai;  pen- 
tevkonta. stevgan d j a[n ka ϝoikodomevs[ei . . . . .]~ e] devndrea puteuvsei, to;n 
ϝoikodomevsanta kai; puteuvsant[a] kai; privaqai k jajpodovqai. vac. to;n de; strat-   4 
agevtan kai; to;n kosmivonta o[~ k ja[ge[i] jR[i]ttenavde kosmeǹ peda; to ̀jRittenivo  
kovsmo to;n me; peiqovmenon to ̀jporivm[o, d]aiovmen de; darkna;n kai; katakrevqai  ped- 
av te to ̀starto ̀kai; peda; toǹ jRittenivon: pl[ivo]n de; me; damiovmen: aij de; plivon 
 damiovs- 
ai e[ me; katakrevsaito, kseneivai divka[i di]kavddeqai. ejnekurasta;n de; me; parevrpe-   8 
n Gortuvnion ej~134 to ̀jRittenivo. aij dev ka n[ik]aqeì toǹ ejnekuvron, diplei ̀katastas̀- 
ai ta;n ajplovon tima;n ai\ ejn tài povrai135 e[gra]ttai, pravdden de; to;n jRittevnion kosm- 
on. aij de; ka me; pra;ddonti, to;n~ preig[ivs]ton~ touvton~ praddovnta~ a[paton 
e[men vac. ta; ejgrammevn j, alla de; mev. vac. o[ti dev [ka au\]t[i]~ ajnpipaivsonti to; 
 koino;n oij jRi-             12 
ttevnioi porti; to;n~ Gortunivon[~ ------]n to;n kavruka jRittenavde ejn tai`d (d)ev- 
ka parevmen e[ aujto;n~ a[llon~ p[r]o; [touvton ajp]okrivneqqai kat j ajgora;n ϝeumevn- 
an tà~ a[ij]tiva~ a\~ aijti[av]s[ontai, ta;n d]e; krivsin e[ men] ai\per tai~̀ aj[-- 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Gods.  On these terms let the Rhittenioi be self-governing and self-adjudicating, separate 
from the Gortynians, (on the condition that) 
they furnish the trieteric sacrifices worth 350 staters. 
Whoever builds a house or plants trees may 
offer the constructed house and planted trees for sale.  The startegetas136   4 
and the one administrating as kosmos, whichever leads (?) to Rhitten shall, in the 
presence 
of the Rhittenian kosmos bring to order whoever does not obey the porimo137; they shall 
                                                
134 The Gortynian dialect ej~ probably functions here more like the Attic ejk. 
135Van Effenterre and Ruzé's original reading is ejn tài (ej)p j o[rai e[ gra]ttai” (the one at the back), 
but I have used the PHI text for emendation. 
136See my discussion page 44. 
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fine him a drachma and distribute it 
in the presence of the startos  and the Rhittenioi; let them not fine him more.  If they do 
fine him more, 
or if they do not collect it, let it be judged by xenia dika.  A Gortynian creditor 8 
may not seize security from a Rhittenian.  If he is convicted in a case concerning the 
security, let him pay double 
the fine as it is written on the pora(?)138.  The Rhittenian kosmos shall exact it. 
But if he does not exact it, then let the preigistai who exact fines not be liable (to 
penalty). 
(Let these things be authoritative)139j and not otherwise.  If ever in the future the 
Rhittenioi 
           12 
collectively140 should (have a dispute) with the Gortynians, let the herald going to Rhitten 
within ten days 
(order) them or their representatives to be present at the scheduled assembly (in Gortyn?) 
to answer 




VI. IC I.xvi.1 (Chaniotis #18) 
 
   Qeoiv. 
[Tavd je[]bade toì~ Gortunivoi~ kai; toì~ La- 
[toivoi~ ejpi; t]ẁn su;n Eujruavnakti kosmov(n)twn t[o]̀ 
[--------, Govrtuni,] epi; tẁn su;n JOmavrwi to ̀
[---------Latoì: t]a;sponda;n~ a[gen      5 
[kai; ta;n eijravna]n aijei; kai; ta; divkaia dia- 
[krivnen ejn ajllavl]oi~. ta; me;n fanera; pravxa- 
[nta~ aujqamero;]n ajpodovmen, tẁn de; ajfa- 
[nevwn dovmen pr]àxin. aij dev ti~ ajdikèsqa[i] 
[fwnivoi?, dikasta;]n~ eJlevsqw oJ ajdikiovmen[o~]     10 
                                                                                                                                            
137porivm[o is difficult to read and has provoked many conjectures, which Gagarin (unpublished) 
summarizes.  Guarducci (1950 IC IV.80) interprets it as “ephor”, with an early inscription from Prinias, 
while Bile disagrees that this would have been unknown on Crete.  Bile (1988 171 no. 70) suggests 
“tax” (gen. of forimon), which is tempting based upon context, but which Gagarin says is unattested.  
Van Effenterre & Ruzè propose “boundary” (ephorismos), but I agree with Gagarin that this does not 
work well in context. 
138See my note 99, p. 48. 
139 Perlman (unpublished): (kuriva e[men) ta; ejgrammevn... 
140to; koino;n is here translated adverbially, but if it were translated as an accusative instead, could 
suggest that we have some sort of koinon between the Rhittenians and the Gortynians, either a sort of 
proto-federal arrangement, or perhaps just the descriptor for the alliance between the two cities.  See 
page 50. 
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[------------------o{n]~ ka lhì aujtov~, oJ me;n Gortuv- 
[nio~ Latoì, oJ de; Lavti]o~ G[ov]rtun[i: o]iJ de; aiJle- 
[qevnte~ dikastai; dikaddov]n[twn o]iJ me;n Gor- 
[tuvnioi vacat? Lat]oì, oiJ de; L[avtioi Govrtuni] 
[ejn dimhv]nwi: [aij de; o]iJ aiJleqevn[te~ mh; dikavxai-]    15 
[en?, pr]attovntwn oJ kovsmo[~ e{kaston dikasta;n? sta-] 
[th̀r]an: to;n de; nikaqevn[ta tài divkai prattovntwn] 
[oJ kov]smo~ tàn triavkon[ta aJmeraǹ to; nivkama kai;] 
[aJp]odovntwn tẁ[i n]ikavsan[ti ------------------] 
[-----] a{n kevlh[tai ---] nivkama AI[------------]     20 
[....: aij dev ka mh; p]ravxaien, auj[toi; ajpoteisvantwn] 
[------------------]ORIOIENAUTOI[--------------] 
[--------------tẁ]i nikavsanti h] W[---------------] 
[----------------a]ujtovn te kai; ta; b[ivdia---------] 
[-----------------]ANONAIOUCORI[--------------]    25 
[--------aij de; mh; p]ravxaien, uJpovd[ikoi e[stwn to] 
[diplovw?-------------]ELO[...]O M[.]LH[----------] 
[-------------------tò aiJl?]iomevno dikavt- 
[ten? --- oJ ajdikiovmen]o~ tẁi kovsmwi ejpi; 
[t]ò ejpistamevno [kov]smo, tov~ ka aujto~     30 
e{lhtai dikastavn~: oJteìo~ dev ka kovsmo~ 
mh; bevrdhi kata; ta; gegramevna ajpotei- 
savtw pa;r to;n tivta[n] ajgrurivw diakosivo~ stathr̀a~ 
e{kasto~ oJ kovsmo~: m[w]lhǹ to;n leivonta 
kh[cen ta;n hJmivnan, ta;n de; hJmivnan tài pov-     35 
li: timaì~ de; crhsiovmeqa taì~ ej~ to ̀dia- 
gravmmato~ to ̀tẁn Krhtaievwn a|i eJkavs- 
twn e[graptai: kata; ta; aujta; de; kai; oiJ uJ- 
povboikoi uJpecovntwn to; divkaion toì~ La- 
tivoi~ Govrtuni. ajnagryavntwn de; be-      40 
kavteroi ejn brutan[eivwi ta;] hjgrammevna. 
  vacat. 
 
Gods. 
It has been agreed upon by the Gortynians and the Latoans 
while those with Euryanax [son of ----] were kosmoi 
[at Gortyn], and those with Homaros [son of ----] 
[were kosmoi at Lato;] let them make the libations     5 
[and the] perpetual [peace] and have mutual jurisdition 
[between each other].  Let us return the assessed public property 
[immediately], but let us [make an assessment] 
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of private property.  But if someone should be wronged,  
let the one wronged choose the judge       10 
[-------------------]  whomever he prefers, the Gortynian 
at Lato, and the Latoan at Gortyn; let the chosen 
judges judge, the Gortynian judges 
[at] Lato, [the Latoan judges at Gortyn(?)] 
[within two months]; [but if] the chosen judges [do not    15 
judge(?), let] the kosmos assess [each judge(?) {some amount?} 
staters]; let the kosmos [assess] the losing party [in the judgment] 
within thirty [days from the loss and] 
let them hand over to the winner [--------------------- 
------] which should be ordered, the judgment[--------    20 
----; but if they should not] make the assessment, [let them pay 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-------------------for] the winner or [---------------------------- 
-------------------]himself and his [private property----------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------    25 
------if he should not]make the assessment, [let him be] liable 
[to a double fine(?) --------------------------------------------- 
[----------------------the] chosen(?) judges(?) 
[-------the wronged person] to the kosmos in the presence 
of the kosmoi for that year, let that one      30 
choose the judge; but whichever kosmos does 
not act according to the laws, let each kosmos 
pay 200 silver staters 
to the tax official; whichever of the people was willing, 
let him have half, let the other half go       35 
to the city; let us use the financial penalties in the dia- 
gramma of the Cretans, each of which 
was written; let the hypoboikoi  
undergo trial in the same way as the Latoans 
at Gortyn.141  Let each city read out       40 
the written stipulations in each’s Prytaneion. 
 
 
                                                
141 Perlman 1996 239: also could be translated as “Let the hypoboikoi defend themselves from charges 
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